The Analysis Of Chinese Private Enterprise Merger Behavior Based On The Game Theory

In recent years, the quantity and scale on which domestic enterprise merger behaviors together is appearing a fleetness increasing tendency. From director angle, enterprise merger behaviors together can realize fast expansion of the enterprise assets : The angle as far as secondary financial affairs is concerned, it can able to bring bigger tax revenue benefits to enterprise as well; As for developing tactics, the behaviors served as a shortcut way of enterprise developing .Specific measures such as buying together , uniting and going bankrupt by putting enterprise into practice can adjust enterprise depositing amounts assets , optimize industrial structure and improve an efficacy effectively.At first, this thesis from buy the realistic meaning of merger behavior to begin ,also sum up the latest production of domestic and international expert, scholar about the merger behavior; Making concrete description of merger behavior; According to different standard to classify the behavior. Combine according to the actual circumstance of private enterprise, put forward some strategies in keeping with its. The most important is we analyzed the main law of present China relevant of mergers, the methods which we adopt made this text have law basis.Following, we adopts one of the Strategic Management methods which is usually use named SWOT analytical law to analyze the advantage, the inferior position, opportunity as well as threat and so on of private enterprise takeover behavior, all-round analytical and annotation our country enterprise merger behavior had inherent advantage, inferior position and chance brought about by outside environment. Through the SWOT analytical method, we may comprehend the whole environment of the private enterprise, and establish stratagem matrix to to put forward some viable strategy combinations.At the same time, we build a gambling model on main means of private enterprise merger behavior—goodwill merger model and hostile merger model. Analyzing the two models of there inherent characteristic and condition, development game order, strategy choose and the efficacy function, and deducing the consummate game Nash balance son untie.. And, even carries out objective analysis on the two kinds. Using the reverse induction to seek the solution and then getting the result, we find even the result and reality matches very much. In fact, the consultation process of both sides according to buying behavior is a process of how one can acquire maximizes benefit and make the other party satisfied as well.