A Study On Dynamic Alliance Profit Distribution And Intellectual Property Risk Evaluation In Accumulative Innovation

The 21 century is a revolutionary age, innovation is the major force to impel the social revolution. Only by innovation can an enterprise strengthen its core competence, and gain its room for existence and development in the market environment with intense competition. The causes such as the revolution of world information technology, the challenge of knowledge economy, weak competence of core technology in high-tech field, shortage of various resources in our country, and small per capita volume of available resources determines that we must take the path of independent innovation to realize the sustainable development of our economy. In comparison to the developed countries in the world, the quality of our technology innovation is obviously poorer. Therefore we have to enhance continuous improvement of the existing innovative results, to acquire breaking achievements and raise the quality of the innovation evidently through accumulative innovation.Dynamic alliance itself is an innovative organization. It can realize advantages combination and resources sharing among its members, and lower the risk which the many uncertain factors in accumulative innovation have brought. This paper points out dynamic alliance is an effective organizing form to carry out accumulative innovation through analysis of three aspects in accumulative innovation, i.e. technology research & development, cooperative production and market entry. By introducing the theory of"the tragedy of the commons"and"the tragedy of the anti-commons", the paper analyses the three regular ways by which the subsequent innovator pays off the innovation license fee to the former innovator in accumulative innovation- introduction fee taking, profit distribution and quantity deduction. It discovers that quantity deduction will lead to the tragedy of"the anti-commons"no matter the number of former innovator is clear or not, and that profit distribution will lead to"anti-commons"situation only when the number of former innovator is unknown. It also discovers through game theory that due to the existence of"anti-commons"situation, the former innovators granting innovation license independently is lack of efficiency comparing with the former innovators coming to terms and co-grant licenses to subsequent innovators.There is private profit and mutual profit in dynamic alliance. To measure the reliance degree of the members on the alliance by the conception of private to mutual benefit ratio, and to describe the unequal relationship of alliance members through discount element, the imbalanced relationship among alliance members leads to their different expectation on profits. If the profit distribution is reasonable is a key factor to affect the steady function of the alliance. The establishment of profit distribution model under the game sequence in the three phases of accumulative innovation, the analysis of the profits of allied parties, could lead to the best profit distribution ratio between former innovation and subsequent innovation. Considering subsequent innovation is a dynamic alliance itself, use Shapley—Value distribution, distribute based onτ—Value or shadow price of alliance innovation resources to distribute reasonably the profits in this phase. Dynamic alliance is an opening organization, the pervasion of accumulative innovation achievements will damage the profits of alliance members. The paper establishes the intellectual property risk index system of dynamic alliance accumulative innovation, and evaluates it by the mathematic method of set-valued statistics,It can be a reference for the dynamic alliances to control intellectual property risks effectively.