Research On The Regime Of The Allocation And Balance Of Power In The Corporate Governance Of China's SOPE

The Decisions on Major Issues With Regard to Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy System made in The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party shed lights on the systematic transformation of China's state-owned enterprises in the new period. Thereafter, state-owned assets supervision and administration commission (SASAC) at all levels has been established and explored a feasible management system. A new operational regime in which various governments, SASAC, subordinate enterprises and state-owned joint, controlling and proprietary companies get involved has been set up. The solo stockholder in a subordinate enterprise is often perplexed by the factory director responsibility system of the SOEs in the process of governance. How to implement the reasonable allocation of power and how to balance the power among governments, agents, investors, the board of directors and the board of supervisors will be an urgent task in the process of deepening the reform of SOEs in the future. As a result, based on the current policies, laws and regulations, and the real conditions, this paper analyzes how to institute the corporate governance of a state-owned proprietary enterprise(SOPE) in order to make some proposals for the national economic reform. Four chapters make up the thesis:The first chapter is an introduction which contains the research topic, background, and significance.The second one poses a general description of the theories relevant to the corporate governance of a state-owned proprietary company. In this chapter, the notion of SOPE, the characteristics of China's SOPE, and the state stock and property rights are firstly discussed. Furthermore, based on the legal definition of the corporate governance, the change in the core of the corporate governance and three fundamental international governance patterns are analyzed. Finally, the essence of the corporate governance is how to allocate and balance power.The third mainly discusses the current situation and the existing problems of the allocation and balance of power in the corporate governance of China's SOPE. In this chapter, the first part is to analyze the deficiency in the supervision and administration system of China's state assets; the second one is to depict the regulations of the allocation and balance of power in the corporate governance of China's SOPE, those issued by the Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China and the Provisional Regulations of the State-owned Assets; the last to present the significant deficiency in the unclear orientation of SASAC, in the personnel decision controlled by governments and SASAC, as well as in the deprivation of the power of the board of Supervisors posterior to the deepening analysis of the systematic shortcomings.The forth makes some proposals about how to reconstruct the regime of the allocation and balance of power in the corporate governance of China's SOPE. These proposals are: the separation of the administration and supervision of SOPE from the responsibility of the SOPE as an investor; the construction of the strong corporate governance of SOPE with the board of directors as the core; the change of the board of supervisors into the stage on which the interested persons govern the corporation; the establishment of effectively stimulating and supervising the management, etc.