| In the era of knowledge economy,the rapid development of science and technology based on the Internet,big data and artificial intelligence,and the new economic situation of"new normal" and"anti globalization" are bringing unprecedented opportunities and challenges to China's economic transition.At present,with the deepening of China's reform and opening up and the construction of market economy,the deepening of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has always been a hot topic of great concern from all walks of life.In general,China's state-owned enterprises have been combined with the market economy after several rounds of reform,and their overall operation quality and internationalization have been significantly improved.However,in the face of the continuous development of economy and society,the traditional corporate governance model of state-owned enterprises is becoming more and more difficult to meet the development needs of the era of knowledge economy,and some long-standing deep-seated problems and disadvantages are becoming more and more prominent.Therefore,how to seize the opportunity of the times,make use of the advantages of different ownership capital,activate the innovation vitality of state-owned enterprises and give full play to the advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics is not only an important measure for China's economic transformation and upgrading,but also a key link to comprehensively deepen the reform of mixed ownership and promote the transformation of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises at this stage.In the field of corporate governance,the management is in a very important position in the corporate governance structure.Their main task is to be responsible for the specific daily business activities of the company and to be the actual executor of the formulation and implementation of the enterprise strategy.Managerial power refers to the ability of managers to influence the corporate governance mechanism and implement their own wishes.With the establishment and continuous improvement of China's modern enterprise system,the allocation of managerial power has gradually become the basic guarantee and effective way to strengthen managers' work enthusiasm and improve organizational operation efficiency.However,the allocation of managerial power is a double-edged sword,which has both advantages and disadvantages.On the one hand,managerial power allocation is an effective incentive means.Reasonable managerial power allocation can effectively reduce the constraints of managers,bring positive effects to support innovation activities,and is conducive to the survival and development of the organization.On the other hand,because the management has the motivation of self-interest behavior,excessive managerial power allocation is easy to bring the negative effect of managerial power rent-seeking,which is bad to the survival and development of the company.In particular,China's state-owned listed companies have relatively unique corporate governance characteristics such as "high concentration of state-owned equity and high degree of administrative intervention in corporate governance",which makes the mechanism design of managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises more complex.Therefore,in view of the above two sides or uncertainties in the managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises,the research on the influence mechanism and effect of the managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises is an important topic to be solved urgently in the academic community,which has important theoretical and practical significance for comprehensively deepening the reform of mixed ownership.Based on this,based on the research background of comprehensively deepening the mixed ownership reform of China's state-owned enterprises,this paper focuses on the contradiction between institutional legitimacy and behavioral effectiveness in the process of implementing the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.From the perspective of managerial power theory,this paper deeply analyzes the influence mechanism and effect of managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises,and jointly discusses how state-owned enterprises achieve the goal of comprehensively deepening the mixed ownership reform through scientific and effective managerial power allocation in the context of Chinese corporate governance,which can not only realize the effective guidance and supervision of government macro-control on the state-owned economy during the transition period,It can also give full play to the basic position of market mechanism in the allocation of production factors.The research on this problem is not only the key content of this paper,but also the core problem that state-owned enterprises must face and solve in order to comprehensively deepen the reform of mixed ownership in the future.In this context,in order to deeply analyze the above problems,this paper systematically considers the background and significance of the research problems,and makes an in-depth study on the basis of combing the relevant literature.Based on the principal-agent theory,modern housekeeper theory,managerial power theory and resource-based theory,the research perspective is focused from the macro level of comprehensively deepening the reform of mixed ownership to the micro level of the research on the allocation of managerial power in state-owned enterprises.According to the logical main line of "influence mechanism managerial power Allocation allocation Allocation allocation effect",this paper analyzes the logic and internal mechanism of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises,further investigates the regulatory effect of the functional background heterogeneity of chairman and general manager,and constructs a theoretical analysis framework for the research on managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises.On this basis,this paper takes the state-owned listed companies that have carried out mixed ownership reform as the research object,chooses the companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2016 to 2019 as the research sample,and extracts the relevant data.Through the research method of combining theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper makes an empirical study on the influence mechanism and effect of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises.The contents and conclusions,we get from the research include the following aspects:Firstly,research on the influence mechanism of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises.This paper mainly analyzes the regularity of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises from three aspects:the basic characteristics of the company,the characteristics of the company's ownership structure and the characteristics of the company's mixed reform,and draws the following conclusions:(1)there is a negative correlation between the enterprise scale of state-owned enterprises and the managerial power allocation,that is,the larger the enterprise scale,the lower the managerial power allocation;(2)The asset liability ratio in the capital structure of state-owned enterprises is negatively correlated with the managerial power allocation,that is,the higher the asset liability ratio is,the lower the managerial power allocation is;(3)Compared with traditional industries,the managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises in high-tech industries is higher;(4)There is a negative correlation between the proportion of state-owned shares and the allocation of managerial power,that is,the higher the proportion of state-owned shares,the lower the allocation of managerial power;(5)There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises,that is,with the increase of ownership concentration,managerial power allocation shows a nonlinear change trend of first increasing and then decreasing;(6)There is a positive correlation between the degree of separation of two rights and managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises,that is,the higher the degree of separation of two rights,the higher the managerial power allocation;(7)There is a positive correlation between ownership mix and managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises,that is,the more different sources of equity capital in enterprises,the higher the managerial power allocation;(8)There is a positive correlation between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the power allocation of management in state-owned enterprises,that is,the more directors and supervisors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders,the higher the power allocation of management.Secondly,research on the effect of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises.This paper selects three representative indicators such as market value(Tobin'Q),value preservation and appreciation rate of state-owned assets(CVP)and proportion of new product revenue(PNP)as the corporate performance measurement indicators of state-owned listed companies,studies the relationship between the managerial power allocation level of state-owned enterprises and corporate performance,and draws the following conclusions:(1)There is a positive correlation between the managerial power allocation and operating performance of state-owned enterprises,that is,the higher the managerial power allocation,the higher the market value(Tobin'Q)of state-owned enterprises,the better the operating performance of state-owned enterprises;(2)There is a positive correlation between the managerial power allocation and appreciation of state-owned assets,that is,the higher the managerial power allocation,the higher the State-owned Assets Preservation and appreciation rate(CVP)of state-owned enterprises,and the higher the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets;(3)There is a positive correlation between the managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises and market competitiveness,that is,the higher the managerial power allocation,the higher the proportion of new product revenue(PNP)of state-owned enterprises,and the stronger the market competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.Thirdly,the regulatory effect of functional background heterogeneity between Chairman and general manager.Based on the correlation logic between managerial power allocation and corporate performance in state-owned enterprises,from the perspective of heterogeneity,this paper examines the regulatory role of functional background heterogeneity of chairman and general manager.in the power allocation effect of management in state-owned enterprises,and draws the following conclusions:the functional background heterogeneity of chairman and general manager enhances the power allocation effect of management in state-owned enterprises,Moreover,the heterogeneity of the functional background of the chairman and the general manager has a positive regulatory effect on the correlation between the managerial power allocation and market value(Tobin'Q),the value maintenance and appreciation rate of state-owned assets(CVP)and the proportion of new product revenue(PNP),indicating that the positive effect of the managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises is more significant when there is heterogeneity between the functional background of the chairman and the general manager;A further study of the different functional backgrounds of the chairman and the general manager shows that in the structural combination of the chairman with administrative functional background and the general manager with technical functional background,the positive correlation between the managerial power allocation and corporate performance of state-owned enterprises is the largest;Further research on the regulatory effect of Party organization governance shows that the increase of the number of Party organization members in the board of directors and supervisors high school has a positive regulatory effect on the power allocation effect of the management of state-owned enterprises,indicating that the positive effect of the power allocation of the management of state-owned enterprises is more significant when the party organization participates in corporate governance.This paper enriches the research on the mixed ownership reform and corporate governance of state-owned enterprises,and has theoretical contribution and practical value.The main theoretical contributions and innovations are as follows:(1)this paper provides a correlation model to describe the influence mechanism and effect of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises,and reveals the logic and internal mechanism of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises;(2)Different from the negative effects of managerial power allocation emphasized in the mainstream Western literature,this paper focuses on and analyzes the positive effects of managerial power allocation in the context of Chinese corporate governance,enriching and expanding the managerial power theory;(3)Through the analysis of the regulatory effect of the heterogeneity of the functional background of the chairman and the general manager,this paper further clarifies the right variability of the power allocation effect of the management of state-owned enterprises.The management enlightenment and policy suggestions obtained in this paper:under the influence of the complex and changeable market environment,the comprehensive deepening of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises should be implemented in more details and practice.While introducing different ownership capital,we should make reasonable power arrangement in the internal governance of the company and speed up the reform of state-owned enterprises in the field of corporate governance.Specific policy recommendations include:(1)Correctly understand the decision logic of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform,and improve the scientificity and rationality of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises;(2)Improve the incentive and evaluation system of the management of state-owned enterprises,and give full play to the positive effect of the power allocation of the management of state-owned enterprises;(3)Establish a mechanism for the selection and employment of professional managers in state-owned enterprises and reasonably optimize the structure and combination of leadership teams in state-owned enterprises.This paper still has the following limitations:(1)limitations of research dimensions.This paper mainly analyzes the horizontal allocation of managerial power in state-owned enterprises,but does not discuss the vertical allocation of managerial power in enterprise groups and subsidiaries;(2)Limitations of research data.Because it is difficult to obtain various proxy indicators of the managerial power of state-owned enterprises,the research data need to be collected and sorted manually,which does not rule out the possibility of data distortion caused by incomplete information;(3)Limitations of research variables.In the research process of influence mechanism,this paper mainly selects the key indicators reflecting internal governance factors,without considering external governance related factors.In the research process of allocation effect,the key indicators reflecting the corporate performance of state-owned enterprises are mainly selected,and the dynamic indicators reflecting the growth of state-owned enterprises are not considered.In the process of regulatory effect research,the influence of the functional background heterogeneity of the chairman and the general manager is mainly considered,and the factors such as the power gap and harmonious relationship between the chairman and the general manager are not taken into account.Therefore,this paper may only explore the tip of the iceberg in the "black box" of managerial power allocation in state-owned enterprises.In future research,we will conduct in-depth research on this issue from more perspectives.On the one hand,try to use first-hand data for case study,strengthen the discussion of the combination of theory and practice,and further excavate the practicality of the research conclusions based on the classic cases in China's 40 years of reform and opening up.On the other hand,combined with the shortcomings of this paper,this paper expands the research theme of managerial power allocation of state-owned enterprises,forms a complete research system,and tries to continue to expand the coverage of research samples and improve the universality of research conclusions. |
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