Study On Local Government Technology Buying Policy

Academics and experts has always held that innovation in science and technology functions as an enormous impetus for economic growth and development. In cameralistic studies, however, its positive externalities and high risk often result in insufficient market supply, thus requiring governmental interference. Among those interfering means government technology buying is frequently employed. Yet researches on government purchase in China are rare and shallow. As a country with a vast territory and broad regional discrepancy, where some developed regions are fully capable of technology buying, China must learn fully from international practices and implement government technology buying to its own characteristics and promote it as an important constituent of overall government purchase in order to survive the tierce global competitions of market and comprehensive national power. This paper employs game theory to probe into government technology buying from the cameralistic perspective, featuring both practical and theoretical significance.This thesis illustrates the necessity and feasibility of government technology buying on the basis of public expenditure theories and public choice theories; summarizes government purchase disciplines while presenting the buying process. It also analyzes governmental gaming in the course of government technology buying on the basis of game theory and lead to beneficial inspirations; Moreover, it reviews the practice and experience of government purchase in developed nations to come up with policy suggestions concerning our state inquest.This paper mainly comprises of four sectors:The first sector (Chapter 1) addresses the practical and theoretical background of the thesis, defines fundamentals concepts and outlines the whole framework ,as well as sates the creativeness and limitations.The second section (Chapter 2) discusses the basis and functions of local government technology buying, analyzes its investment disciplines and investigates into the buying process and the roles government plays. The third part (Chapter 3) employs game analysis approach in studying the game among local governments as well as that between local and central governments in different situations under hypothesis.The fourth sector( Chapter 4,Chapter 5 )probes into the existing problems in local government technology buying and provides causation study. It also summarizes the government technology buying practice in developed nations to conclude with policy suggestions to improve that in China.On the whole, this thesis is creative and innovative in (1) the perspective of research: Recent studies abound in the promotion of scientific and technological innovation by government purchase, especially of the central administrative body; However, this thesis steers the study toward the local layer, taking such innovation as profitable potential public goods, serving as local public goods where benefactors are localized. (2) methodology: This thesis applies game analysis while construing into different governments' activities in the process of local technology buying, which is rare in its species.Yet due to limited length and resources, this thesis spares the malfunction problem in local government technology buying process for further research.