Study On The Compensation Incentive Mechanism Of Senior Managerial Staff In State Holding Listed Company

The state holding listed company not only holds a considerable portion of the listed company in China but also plays an important role in the construction of the socialist market economy. After many years' innovation and research, there are still many deficiencies in the compensation incentive mechanism of the senior managerial staff in the state holding listed companies. Therefore it is in need of solution to make and improve their compensation incentive system so as to inspirit the senior managerial staff in the state holding listed companies.Based on the institutional incentive theory of Economics and incentive theory of management, the compensation incentive issues of the senior managerial staff in the state holding listed companies is studied in this paper, in which the compensation of the senior managerial staff is taken as research object. Firstly, with the selection of financial data of the senior managerial staff in the state holding listed companies from 2003 to 2006, the present situation of the senior managerial staff's compensation is statistically analyzed. Secondly, the compensation of the senior managerial staff in the state holding listed companies in 2006 is taking as the sample, an empirical study on the factors that affect the compensation incentive system is performed. It is shown that the level of the senior managerial staff's compensation is strongly influenced by the size of the company, the area where it lies, the tradable proportion and whether there are institutes investors as the share holders, while the stock holding proportion of the senior managerial staff and growth of the company have a little effect on the compensation. On the basis of the above theoretical research and empirical analysis, a compensation incentive system of the senior managerial staff is put forward, which adapts well to the development of the state holding listed companies of our country. Furthermore, the construction of the corresponding external environment is discussed. Finally, some policy suggestions to improve the compensation system of the state holding listed company are given out. The above research results may be of certain reference meaning for the design of the compensation incentive system of the senior managerial staff of the state holding listed company as well as for compensation management.