Research On The Allocation Of The Residual Claims Of Commercial Bank In China

Principal-agency in modern enterprise system shows that the separation of enterpriser and manager has created separating of power which the surplus to be come down on and power which surplus control. Asymmetric information happens, and owing to information asymmetric the principal of enterprise is faced with the problem how to supervise and encourage the agent to serve for self,and the payout to solve this problem is agency cost. Moreover, the enterprise is the corps activity and it is hard to define everyone contribution respectively; therefore, it can give rise to the problem of"loafs on the job".There are multi-layer principals in the commercial banks in china, and there is no real function for the restriction of agent due to the excessively long chain of principals. In order to urge the objective of agent approaching to that of the principal and achieve the maximization of the enterprise value and also guarantee the interest of agent, it is very important to build up suitable mechanisms of excitation and restriction. State-owned commercial banks have faced increasingly competitive pressure and it is far away for the reforms since China joined WTO. It is very important to set up and improve the mechanism of excitation and restriction at the present situation of imperfect corporate governance.First, it indicates the problems of principal–agency in the commercial banks in china,analysing principals in the commercial banks,especialy we analysed the two level relations between top manager and lower-level manager to grasp the agency problems of principal-agency such as "proprietors' a vacant position"and"operate objective alienation". Then,we introduce a model to make further understanding the problems of principal-agency of state-owned commercial banks. The share of residual control rights and residual claim right are both adjusting continuously.The contributions of human capital to creating of enterprise value are are improved and the property right of human capital became more clear, the importance of human capital in enterprise property rights is increasing. the basic project of enterprise governance is how to creat and share the residual value between the parties.In the following part, we focus on the setting up of incentive and restraining mechanisms in order to solve above problem and improve corporate governance. As for encouraging mechanism,this text is aimed at passing through the long-term system analysis that encourage mechanism of west state bank staff,and it is machine-processed to hope that our country commercial bank can build is fit for the long-term excitation of self. Finally, it gives some suggestion on how to improve incentive and restraining mechanisms of commercial banks in china.