A Study On The Causes For The Existence Of Underlying Rules And Its Restraining Means From The Perspective Of New Institutional Economics

As a neologism,"underlying rules"is invented by Chinese historian WuSi in his works Underlying Rules: The Real Game in Chinese History, on which the author bases to reinterpret the Chinese history. After its invention,"underlying rules"has been frequently and widely used in various domains to explain similar phenomena in real life, as well as has aroused scholars'studying passion.However, from current relative studying of some scholars, it is not difficult to find out that scholars hold different opinions on it, furthermore, many studying are superficial to confine the discussion to the matter at issue. It is a huge obstacle for us to realize the nature of underlying rules, the reasons for its overusing in China's comprehensive transitional period, the causes of its existence, and its functional characteristics.The present study tries to reinterpret underlying rules from the perspective of new institutional economics. This thesis consists of five parts. The first part is a general introduction. Based on the studying of scholars at home and abroad, the thesis will illustrate underlying rules from the perspective of new institutional economics. Underlying rules is essentially a kind of institutional opportunism. Then the thesis analyzes its operational mechanism and main characteristics, which may be helpful to understand underlying rules thoroughly. The second part mainly illustrates the reasons for the being of underlying rules from both historical and realistic aspects. The third part firstly analyzes its negative effects on Chinese modernization process, then concludes that the only path to restrain underlying rule and to eliminate institutional opportunism. The fifth part is the conclusion.