The Enterprise Procurement Bidding Mechanism And Incentive Research Based On Game Theory

Purchasing is one of the most important processes in enterprises. And procurement bidding as an advanced trade format was growing up with the development of market economy. More and more companies have used procurement bidding for purchasing. Therefore, companies need scientific and systematic results to guild their procurement policy. Focusing on such practical needs, this paper attempts to study several decision-making operation problems in procurement bidding in supply chain.This thesis begins to introduce the First-Price mechanism and the Second-Price mechanism. We point out that both of these models can not get more profits for buyers when only have few sellers. So we build a new model "Middle-Price mechanism". In this model, we use game theory to analyze the actions of sellers, and build reasonable deal strategy base on seller's actions. Second, traditional procurement bidding can cause so called "winner refuse to perform contract" phenomenon. Base on this problem, we design a new method that is same with multiple sourcing. Through analysis, we can get a conclusion that the real outstanding suppliers have the ability of obtaining more margin than other suppliers; it can provide a good precondition for creating a long period cooperation relationship.Normally, traditional procurement bidding only consider price factor. It can not satisfy requirements of enterprises under the supply chain management environment. So we show a new multidimensional auction, use the method of AHP, score some factor that companies must consider. The buyers make the decision base on these scores that seller make the promise. But under this multidimensional auction, buyers can not acquire how the sellers complete this contract. So we build a prompting mechanism, and get the conclusion that award should high for pursuing risk seller, and award should low for fleeing risk seller.