Tendering And Bidding Mechanism Based On Game Theory

Electric power industry is an infrastructure one of importantance in China. Electric power enterprises procure a large mount of equipment and material each year for construction and operation of power grid. In recent years, State Grid Corporation of China(SGCC) implemented concentrated procurement by means of public tendering as to electric power equipments and material of 330kV and the above voltage. The one of such scale and operational mode is first adopted in electric power industry and many new problems remain to be resolved. To search after new tendering mode, set other industries a good example and make it, from the tender's point of view, this paper is devoted to designing the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on tender agents, bid-evaluators and bidders respectively by means of game theory. This paper's some research are applied to the corresponding activities of SGCC and demonstrated to be effective to some extent.Firstly, reviewing game theory ,its application in the purchasing by invitation to bid ,principal-agent theory, mechanism-designing theory, prestige mechanism theory and contemporary research tendering procurement on in electric power industry, this paper find the study on the mechanism of concentrated procurement by means of public tendering can start from the principal-agent relationships among tenderers,tender agents, bid-evaluators and bidders, and establish the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on the latter three from the tender's point of view.As much larger scale of concentrated procurement than decentralized one, tenderer need lie on professional tender agent and it is necessary that establishing the the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on him. By adopting E-business technology and standard process, the cost of tender agency service can be reduced and it will motivate tender agent to take active part in the concentrated procurement. Signing long term agent contract between tender and tender agent following grim strategy can regulate tender agent's opportunism action. To take regulation mechanism effective, tender need to establishing the cost model of subject matter as supervision mechanism.A scientific concentrated procurement mechanism need establish the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on bid-evaluators so that make the result of bid evaluation fair, just and reasonable. The incentive and regulation mechanism can be established by means of establishing bid-evaluators' dynamic classification system by introducing the prestige mechanism. This paper introduces the analytic network process into the bid evaluation and establishs the supervision mechanism on bid-evaluators.By enlarging the scale of procurement and standardizing the process, mass purchasing through public bidding can reduce production cost and tranction cost so that motivate the bidder to take active part in it. It can regulate the legal bidder by increasing the number of bidders. By employing lawyer and specialist, publicizing the criteria of collusion and resorting to law in case of collusion, it can regulate the bidder with the attempt of collusion. To take regulation mechanism effective, tender need to establishing the cost model of subject matter as supervision mechanism similarly.The above researches are demonstrated to be effective by the concentrated tendering procurement activities in SGCC.Finally, this paper gives the futue research area, that is , how to motivate bidder to innovate on scicence and technology, motivate and regulate the bid-evaluators in some specific fields in mass purchasing through public bidding.