Research Of The Village Committee's Behavior And Influence Factors In The Process Of Transferring Rural Collective Construction Land Based On The Principal-agent Theory

Rural collective construction land is an important factor of land resources, greater space of development and utilization, providing logistic service for the development of industrialization and new urbanization.However, the rural collective construction land in China has a series of problems, such as, the overall size is too large and the layout is scattered, the use mode is single, the right of land development is restricted, the utilization efficiency is low, etc. Therefore, the rural collective construction land entering the market transferring openly and orderly is conducive to realizing intensive use of the collective construction land, and guaranteeing the income and development right of farmers and rural collective economic organizations for collective land. But, at present, China's rural collective construction land transfer is still in the stage of unauthorized, there are many problems. For example:the default and illegal problems is serious in the circulation; land use efficiency is low; income distribution mechanism is not perfect, leading to the interests of farmers are damaged, and the subjects of transfer are facing great risk and cost. Therefore, in order to regularizing the behavior of collective construction land transfer, the Chengdu City introduced the "Chengdu collective construction land use rights transfer management approach (Trial)" in 2010,this policy regulated more clearly and specifically these contents of transferring the collective construction land about transfer scopes, subjects, conditions, prices, procedures and income distributions.This policy provided effective guidance for the local government, the village collectives and enterprises" actual operation in the circulation of rural collective construction land.The village committee conducts the leader in the collective construction land circulation, acting the double agent of farmers and business in all phases of the transfer, its function performance directly affects the interests of the farmers, companies, local governments and other subjects. Therefore, it is necessary that we study the collective construction land transfer in the village would basing on principal-agent theory to perfecting the village committee's double agent behavior. At present, however, the research on this field is in the open state.The paper surveys and interviews the village committee's behavior in the rural collective construction land circulation about Pixian and Dujiangyan Wenjiang of Chengdu including a total of 13 administrative villages (new type of rural community).And, on this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, the paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship and the village committee" behaviors in the process of transferring rural collective construction land. The main conclusions of this paper include the following three aspects:(1) The village committee's double agent behaviors play a role of leadership, organization and coordination of the parties in the collective construction land circulation process, such as, reducing the circulation cost of the farmers and enterprises to some extent. However, there are also some problems, such as the village committee's rent-seeking behavior leading to, the uncertainty of decision-making behavior of the village committee, and the default and illegal risk of village committee's double agent behavior.(2) Based on the analysis of the village committee's double agent behaviors, this paper summarizes the driven and impeding impact factors of the village committee's double agent behavior, the driving factors mainly include the system of land policy support, the choice from the market transactions subjects and the village committee's behavior drived by self-interests. Obstacles factors include that the legal and policy risk is huge, the development of the countryside land property right market is lag, the village committee's behavior is affected by the subjective factors.(3) The paper concludes that the policy makers should pay attention to regulate and guide the double agent behaviors of the village committees. Concrete measures include improving the relevant laws and regulations to reinforce the farmers'role of principal, introducing agent market competition mechanism and collective land price assessment mechanism, and optimizing the incentive and constraint mechanism for the village committee's double agent behaviors.