Study On Local Government Behavior And Its Peformance In The Process Of Farmland Protection

Cultivated land resource has very important significance for food security and social-economic sustainable development. China have formulated corresponding cultivated land protective policies in the period of fast-economic increasing. However, farmland protection and economic development are both the tasks of our country. Farmland is important strategic resource, with the development of economy and expansion of urbanization, the amount of farmland decrease rapidly, and results in the illegal incidents. The performance of farmland protection mainly depends on the information asymmetry between central and local government.This paper aims to study the performance of the local governments in the process of economic development and farmland protection, the pertinence of two tasks and the influence factors of farmland protection. Through the analysis of issues of task execution and the difference of target behavior between local and central governments, give rise to the theoretical analysis of behavior selection, and further analyze the deep reason-information asymmetry. From above analyses, to set up a Double—Task Principal -Agent Model between central and local governments, and in-depth research of the principal-agent relationship between local governments and upper level farmland management developments, and gain the inventive conditions of harmonize the two tasks of local government.On the basis of the above theoretical analysis, through the empirical study on the impacts of influence factors on the farmland protection, the paper also puts forward some available suggestions for the effective and sustainable mechanism of farmland protection, for instance, balance measures for occupation and compensation to land should be strengthened, intensify the supervision upon local governments.