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A Research On The Principal-Agent Relationship Of State-Owned Enterprise Business Operator’s Incentive Mechanism Of The Prestige

Posted on:2016-06-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X L YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330467982493Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The new fourth session of the central management of the national enterprises is mainly responsible for the compensation system for the people on August18,2014. Guidance on the reference of the enterprises salary management to strengthen the executive compensation management international practice, and five identified base practices central person in charge of the enterprise salary management:fist,insist on combination of government supervision and market regulation;second,adhere the to unity of the incentive and constraint;third, adhere to the short-term incentive and the long-term incentive balance;forth, Stick to responsible compensation growth and the wage growth coordination;fifth, uphold and perfect compensation system and the standardize the supplementary insurance, post consumption matching. To develop a reasonable and effective salaryincentive mechanism of state owned those enterprises manager role is important for promoting the reform of the state-owned enterprise of our country.The principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises belong to the national property. From the central to deepen the comprehensive reform leading group of this reform plan,we can learn that to hook the executive compensation and average wage wage of workers is very reasonable. for linking performance pay and assessment, long term incentive by the principle of prudence is well, since the reform and opening up, central management of enterprises responsible for the pay system reform has made the positive achievements.And it promote the developing of the reform,but there is a lot of problems such as unreasonable salary structure. From the basic national conditions of China’s primary stage of socialism,we will adapot to the reform of state-ownend assets management system and lots of state-owned enterprises process and gradually standardize the distribution order of state-owned enterprise income.to realize the compensation level adaptation.Therefore, how to design the state-owned enterprise managers develop an effective incentive mechanism is particularly critical.Our country’s State-owned business is far indiffident force in our country market economy and its operating condition influences to not only the economical quality but aslo social development. There is research who indicated:There is the leading relation with the State-owned business’s operating condition state-owned business operator’s business capacity. Therefore,establishing far better State-owned business operator’s incentive mechanism is very advantageous for the operators to enhance the diligently horizontal.This paper first intrduced the background of the research, the significance, main research content and method, the article mentality, the possible innovation as well as insufficient spot.Also we concrete introduced the core theory’s related content and our country State-owned business r’s drive history process is contained, discussing the kinds of the short-term behaviors and the heart problems which exist our country State-owned business operator’s salary mechanism at present. And the domestic and much foreign research present situation is also introduced. Based on the fact that ourv country’s State-owned business operator’s sduty is the multi-duty present situation, this paper mainly improved the prestige and the single duty dynamic drive model and then established the dynamic incentive mechanism model account of prestige as for our country State-owned business operator multi-duty condition. And at last the drive reward coefficient and the operator’s level of working hard had carried on the further analysis.And incentive mechanism superiority and the practice is mentionded at the end of the paper.Based upon multi-duty’s principal-agent model’s pattern, this article has studied the dynamic incentive mechanism as for our country State-owned business operator’s drive effect. Form the analysis of the modle,it is easy to discover that for us:Through establishing the mechanism of State-owned business operator’s dynamic incentive, its achievement sharing coefficient is far lower than single period achievement sharing coefficient at the same situation.However, the State-owned business operator’s level diligently still is above the level of the single time drive reward. And This is what the article proof under multi-duties, as for our country’s State-owned business, applying the dynamic incentive mechanism has a better importance.At the same time,we should pick up a very reasonable coefficient of the performance, perfect the mechanism of the information disclosure mechanism,and to establish and perfect the supervision mechanism and so on.
Keywords/Search Tags:the State-owned business operator’s Dynamic, incentive, principal-agent model, multi-duties, salary
PDF Full Text Request
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