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Research On Two-Stage Incentive Mechanism Of Information Sharing In Supply Chain

Posted on:2010-04-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y H LinFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360275994224Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Based on the principal-agent theory, in this thesis, a two-stage incentive mechanism of information sharing in supply chain is proposed. When the revenue of information sharing relies on the partner's information sharing effort level, the influence from the core enterprise on the partner is considered in the models. And the two-stage incentive mechanism regardless lag-revenue is compared by the one with lag-revenue, and the results of the models are verified by examples. The main content is as follows:(1) The study of information sharing in supply chain is reviewed and the research ideas are proposed, and some specific terms involved are defined.(2) The two-stage incentive mechanism regardless lag-revenue is compared by the one with lag-revenue when the core enterprise's character influences the partner's information sharing effort. The research indicates: the greater the influence from the core enterprise on the partner is, the smaller the fixed income of the partner while the larger the incentive coefficient will be; the partner's information sharing effort level of the second stage is high than the first stage when the lag-revenue isn't considered; comparatively, the partner's information sharing effort level stays the same in the second stage but improves in the first stage when the lag-return is considered, and the improvement positively correlated to the lag-revenue coefficient.(3) The two-stage incentive mechanism regardless lag-revenue is compared by the one with lag-revenue when the core enterprise's collaborative effort influences the partner's information sharing effort. The research indicates: the partner's information sharing effort level positively correlated with the core enterprise's collaborative effort; The stronger ability the core enterprise has, the harder it works; the partner improves its effort in the first stage when the lag-revenue is considered in the incentive mechanism, and the improvement positively correlated to the lag-retum coefficient as well as the core enterprise's collaborative effort of the first stage.(4) The main conclusions of the research work are summarized and some suggestions are provided for management practice. Besides, some prospects are discussed.
Keywords/Search Tags:Information Sharing, Incentive Mechanism, Lag-Revenue
PDF Full Text Request
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