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Study On The Value Measure And Incentive Mechanism Of Information Sharing In Supply Chain Under Fuzzy Environment

Posted on:2014-01-24Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y H WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330398453353Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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With the economical globalization, enterprises face more and more fierce competition.Enterprises must strengthen cooperation and fully shared information with other companies.It can allocate the resources, make system more efficiency and realize the goals of supplychain management. Therefore, abundant information sharing is a successful way to realizesupply chain management.As the market demand is uncertain, and this uncertainty is ambiguity. So, regard themarket demand as fuzzy variables to study the value measure and incentive mechanism ofinformation sharing in supply chain under fuzzy environment.Firstly, the value measure of information sharing in supply chain is studied underfuzzy environment and the value model of supplier-led in supply chain is established. Thenby comparing the value under information sharing with the value under no informationsharing, the conclusion is given. Finally, using Nash Bargaining Theory the value of supplychain under information sharing.Due to the impact of the information sharing on various members is inconsistent,some members don’t want to take part in the information sharing. This dissertation studiesthe incentive mechanism of information sharing in supply chain under fuzzy environmentto incentive members actively take part in the information sharing. Finally, the conclusionis given that revenue-sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination.This dissertation also studies the transfer incentive in information sharing under fuzzyenvironment. By establishing the model of incentive mechanism and analyzing it, theconclusion is given that transfers contracts can realize the stable coordination of supplychain system.
Keywords/Search Tags:Information sharing, incentive mechanism, fuzzy variables
PDF Full Text Request
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