Research On Collusion And Collusion-proof Mechanism During Equipment Acquisition

The particularity of equipment and its acquisition process results in an appreciable possibility that collusion would happen,and the collusion seriously damages the efficiency of resource allocation. To study the problem of collusion and collusion-proof mechanism design during the equipment acquisition,the paper establishes a systematic analysis framework, elaborates the collusion problem in the paradigm of principal-agent,analyses several kinds of collusion forms with their causes,nodes,stability,and their influences on all players'utility level and efficiency of resource allocation. With the analysis above as basis,the paper investigates the design and implementation of collusion-proof mechanism.To prevent the happening of collusion,we should make the cost of collusion behavior itself higher and reduce the profit of collusion. In addition to these,different kind of collusion-proof mechanism should be designed to prevent the happening of different collusion forms. To prevent horizontal collusion from happening during the equipment acquisition,we should pay most of our attention to aggravating the informational asymmetry between the agents,which would make their coordinating each other's action costly,and thus result in a failure of their collusive attempt. However,the permission of price renegotiation during the manufacturing period would lead the collusion-proof mechanism to a failure. So,the paper suggests that the bidding contract should be strictly enforced. To prevent vertical collusion from happening during the equipment acquisition,we should make the abuse of power costly for the agent itself. Additionally,the operation of collusion-proof mechanism to prevent the happening of vertical collusion may be dramatically affected by the operational cost of the mechanism. But,if we consider the special status of equipment acquisition action in the process of national defense and military modernization and think about the issue from a perspective of long-range interest,we could find out that we should prevent and punish any form of collusion with no hesitation,though it may seem costly from the perspective of a short term.The prevailing collusion-proof mechanism in our PLA can be generalized into morality filtering mechanism,promotion mechanism and inspection mechanism. With the use of analytical measures of modern economics,the paper probes their effects to prevent the happening of collusion during the equipment acquisition,analyzes the factors that have influences on their function,and puts forward suggestions to improve these three kinds of collusion-proof mechanism. The paper insists that the measures to prevent collusion from happening should be employed as an unity,only then can the measures take into effect sufficiently. We should try hard not to use a single measure to prevent collusion from happening. The operation of collusion-proof mechanism should be carefully and adequately considered with its operational environment,such as our China's abundant resource of ethics and morality. Apart from these,we should consider and make use of some characteristics of our army's prevailing system,which includes the moral selection function of the ideological and political censorship system,the guiding function of the ideological and political education system,the incentive function of the promotion system,the preventive function of inspection system on the collusion behavior,and so on.