An Optimal Incentive Analysis Between Carrier And Shipper With Asymmetric Information

On the practice of supply chain management, we always studied the carriers'performance when the shippers choose carriers to carry for him. This kind of research belong to afterwards assess, it is short of goad and initiative. Many cases about lose can be find everywhere because of choosing improper carriers, the main reason is that there exist asymmetric information between the shipper and the carrier. Many people studied the supply chain management of the principal agent relation between the manufacturer, seller and tradesman. But litter discussed the game relation about the shippers identify and choose the appropriate carrier. In fact, the choice and incentives of carriers pay large important in reducing the cost of carry and improving the whole performance of supply chain. The importance to the ship trade's choice in international ship showed especially distinct.At first, the paper shows the optimal incentive contract model between the seller and the carrier in the supply chain with asymmetric information and investigates the qualification that the optimal effort level comes true and the problem about the optimal contract planning of the carrier in both environments with asymmetric information and symmetric information. The level of optimal effort made by a carrier with asymmetric information is proved lower than that with symmetric information. This paper also discuss some different parameters, for example, the degree of the hazard in market, the coefficient of effort cost and the stability of the market, as all can influence the contract parameter in the optimal use to the shipper. Finally, the direction of the seller to reduce the agent cost was showed.Based on the reputation theory , A model of dynamic game between shipper and carrier is established, the problem of the contract planning in the environment of dynamic game is analyzed; we show that the amended reputation ability of the carrier play a good affect to increase the optimal effort level by comparing with the result of static model of the incentive contract without reputation mechanism; the paper also shows that some different parameters can influence the optimal contract planning parameter and the optimal effort level. Finally, Conditions of achieving effective reputation incentive is pointed out.The paper establishes the contrast designing and venture analysis model between the shipper and carriers under multi-agents. We establish some models when the shipper offers non-relative performance evaluation and relative performance evaluation and the situation of the carriers work together. We also investigate that some parameters changes can influence the optimal contract planning parameter and the optimal effort level under Matlab. Finally, the optimal effect level and the optimal contract planning parameter and the total risk in all kinds of model were compared.At last, the paper starts off form the principal offers the contrast (the principal goes first) and the agent offers the contrast (the agent goes first) respectively, we discuss the optimal effort level, the parameter of the incentive contrast and the effect to the expect utility of the one who offers the contrast in the different situations with asymmetric information and symmetric information, respectively. The paper also show some different parameters, for example, the degree of the hazard in market, the coefficient of effort cost and the stability of the market, as all can influence the contract parameter and the level of the effort in the optimal utility to the contrast planner. Finally, the directions of the contrast planner to increase his expect utility was showed.