The Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Logistics Outsourcing Under The Condition Of Multi-agents

With the rapid development of the economic and the technology in our country, and what the customers need is various, the competition is more and more severe to the company in the market. The company spends their energy to focus on their core-competitiveness. To outsourcing their logistics to the third-party logistics companies, which can plan it as a whole logistics of each link, and give full play to the complementarity between each link of logistics. On the other side, as the improve of the operation level of logistics, and the long-term win-win and cooperation of both sides, the logistics companies can improve the service and meet the logistics outsourcing logistics costs reasonable requirements at the same time.Enterprises outsourcing its logistics to the third party logistics enterprise, which need to build an incentive mechanism to make the third party logistics enterprise to do better for their own services. Enterprise may also outsourcing its logistics to multiple third-party logistics enterprises at the same time. Research on incentive mechanism of outsourcing logistics is mostly based on the condition of single principal and single agent. However, enterprise is likely to outsourcing its logistics to multiple third-party logistics at the same time. Therefore, this paper will research on the incentive mechanism of enterprise outsourcing the logistics to multiple third party logistics.Based on principal-agent theory, this paper first analyses the incentive mechanism design when outsourcing to some third-party logistics companies under symmetric information, and analyses the incentive mechanism when the company and the third-party logistics enterprises holds different risk preferance. Finally base on the numerical analysis to concluded that the effect on the incentive mechanism. Second, this paper analyses the incentive mechanism design when outsourcing to some third-party logistics companies under asymmetric information. And the same to analyses the incentive mechanism when both hold different risk preference, and finally base on the numerical analysis to concluded that the effect on the incentive mechanism.In the end, the paper analysis the expected-utility of the company, the utility of third-party logistics enterprises and the total social utility of outsourcing creates under different risk preference between the two sides. It is concluded that the effectiveness of the third party logistics enterprises will not change as the change of the risk attitudes on both sides.The utility of the logistics outsourcing enterprise and the total utility of outsourcing in logistics outsourcing vary with the revenue sharing coefficient, and when it is the optimal revenue sharing coefficient, its utility gained by the best.