The Study On Governance Structure Of Logistics Trading On The Basis Of Transaction Cost In Our Country

In recent years, logistics has become an important industrial department in national economy, on which has been taken more and more emphasis. The logistics outsourcing based on core competence has turned to the trend of industrial logistics operational modes. Compared with the international cotemporaries, the logistics in China has great deficiency in effective demand with the slow development of logistics outsourcing. The research is carried out from the perspective of transaction efficiency instead of the technical efficiency. There is great trade-cost in the process of logistics trading, which is a crucial reason resulted in the deficiency of logistics outsourcing. The rational logistics management model is defined in this dissertation according to the nature of logistics trade. In order to reduce the trade-cost in logistics bargaining and get the trade efficiency, the logistics management model is actualized through the suitable governance mechanisms.This dissertation firstly introduces a survey of logistics bargaining home and broad. After that the related theories on governance structure in China including the theory of transaction cost, transaction nature, and modern property right and consignment agency have been presented. The trade nature in China's logistics transaction and its cause are analyzed in details on the basis of believe that the high trade efficiency can be acquired only by the well matching between transaction structure and its nature. The strategic alliances are proposed as a reasonable logistics governance structure to the China's condition. The rationalities of strategic alliances are manifested as follows. On the point of institutional economics, strategic alliances are the double preponderances inter-organization with the trade-cost reduction leading to the Pareto improvement. Moreover, strategic alliances do reduce the average trade-cost of cooperative proposal of both sides in the explanation in new classical economics. Meanwhile the stability of strategic alliances is proved by the complete information and incomplete information static game in Game theory. It is believed that the different governance mechanisms will be maximized with guarantee of corresponding institutions. So the cooperation model of strategic alliances is designed by the application of modern property rights and consignment agency theory finally.