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Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Inventory Pledge Loans Between Financial Institution And Logistics Enterprise

Posted on:2011-11-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360308977679Subject:Business management
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This dissertation selects incentives between financial institutions and logistics enterprises of inventory pledge loan as the research object. This dissertation mainly analyses the principal-agent relationship in financial institutions, which based on the theories of Principal-Agent, Inspirit and Restrict, the knowledge of Game theory and other related disciplines. Analogy and contrast, modeling, case studying are the main methods. At last, according to the situation and drawbacks of inventory pledge loan in China, this dissertation provides several countermeasures for the development of inventory pledge loan incentive mechanisms.The following two aspects indicate this dissertation's innovation mainly:First, this dissertation defines the principal-agent relationships of inventory pledge loan from theoretical analysis and model proof, and uses a case to demonstrate the functions of the improved incentive mechanism; second, this dissertation combines the present situation of principal-agent incentive mechanism, gambling model analysis and findings of principal-agent incentive mechanism of inventory pledge loan, and then consummates the principal-agent incentive mechanism.This dissertation starting from the basic theories of principal-agent, incentive mechanism and inventory pledge loan, and then entering into the core parts which analyzes the principal-agent relationship and existing incentive mechanism between financial institutions and logistics enterprises. Meanwhile, the tripartite game equilibrium is analyzed, and then focus on how to improve the existing incentive mechanism. By calculating the examples, it demonstrates that the improved incentive mechanisms greatly encourage the logistics enterprises; finally, this dissertation gains the conclusion as bellow:1. Three participants of inventory pledge loan compose the dual principal-agent relationships. Three fixed factors, which are asymmetric information, contractual relationships and profit configuration, compose the dual principal-agents relationships. In the inventory pledge loan, logistics enterprise acts as the agent of financial institution and the principal of finance company.2. The existing incentive mechanism between financial institutions and logistics companies has three mainly disadvantage, such as the incentive mechanism is too single, the rewards can't match the performance and the reputation incentive mechanism hasn't formed.3. The inspection and confirmation probability of financial institutions has a positive relationship with total fraud revenue. However, it has a negative relationship with fines, normal earnings of logistics enterprises and finance companies when there's no fraud.4. The fraud probability of finance companies has a positive relationship with the inspecting cost of financial institutions and the normal earnings of financial institutions when there's no fraud. However, it has a negative relationship with the inspection and confirmation probability of financial institutions, the expected total revenue and fines of fraud.5. Under current revenue sharing incentive mechanism, the motivation of maximizing profit of financial institution and logistics enterprise are incompatible. Thus, logistics enterprise may sacrifice the benefit of financial institution in order to maximize its own utility.6. Revenue of logistics enterprise changes in the same direction of the recovering speed of loans when financial institution takes a "Claw-Back" clause. This means the sooner financial institution recovers the loans, the more logistics enterprise gets. Conversely, the less it gets.7. If financial institution sets different sharing ratios depending on the capital scale of inventory pledge loans, logistics enterprise will get less from lots of small business comparing to a few of large business.Finally, according to the above conclusions, this dissertation offers several practical advices for financial institutions in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of logistics enterprises. Meanwhile, this dissertation indicates the limits and the future direction of the research.
Keywords/Search Tags:Inventory Pledge Loans, Principal-Agent, Information Asymmetry, Incentive Mechanism
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