| Funds are the "blood" of enterprise, "Cash is king" vividly illustrates the importance of the enterprise funds.Debt financing and equity financing are two main types of business financing, due to our uniqueness, our corporate finance theory is different from pecking order theroy.equity financing become the preferred in China. Money connects investors, companies and regulatory bodies,Funds can bring benefits to businesses and investors, but how to protect the interests of investors is the regulatory body's responsbility.Companies are not always very honest after raising funds from the stock market.They often infringe upon the interests of investors for personal gain. China's regulators have made great effort to reduce the degree of the business's attempting the self-interest. Although our regulatory agencies have done a lot for the fund-raising regulations, also adopted many measures to reduce the degree of changing the fund-raising. However,for getting the interests,changing the capital to invest in companies is still widespread, how to better regulate the use of corporate fund-raising and minimize changes in corporate self-interest to raise funds in order to invest in, is a significant and meaningful problems in front of us. The supervisory authority don't give the same supervision to all types of enterprises compairing to the central enterprises.how all types of enterprises performance after raising funds? With the advance of the process of China's market, does Chinese companies performance more conscious or more rampant after raising funds from the stock market? Those questions are the focus of this article.In the process of China's reform,the very characteristics are decentralization, the relationship between government and enterprises and private economic development. The central and local administrative rights were in an unstable state in the pre-reform decentralization,only involves the division of rights,do not involve the relationship between the state and enterprises, the relationship between government and the market, the Central Government decided how to arrange rights which didn't affect the interests of all parties, especially had little effect on the relationship between different local goverments,so had the the strong color of planned economy. But after the reform,the objective of decentralization is based on the market, integrated the administrative decentralization and the decentralization of economic.The relationship between central and local governments are not simply the administrative relationship and the relationship between higher and lower levels, local governments have their own economic interests and behavior goals, there macro-objectives of local government behavior deviated from the central government. The gap between regions began to take shape, the performance of mutual competition between enterprises is reflected in the competition among regional governments. Therefore, different regions of the state-owned enterprises face the different government intervention and have different performance in changing the toward of funds, The relationship between government and enterprises deverlops along with the process of China's planned economy transforming to a market economy. "Property rights clearly established, right and obligation clearly estabished, the enterprise and the government are divided,manage scientificly"are requirements of the modern enterprise .But the real separating government from enterprises have not yet realized, the central enterprises and local enterprises in the development process have the varying degrees of influence from the Government,so they have varying degrees of motivation to change the toward of funds. The private enterprises,which have little government intervention, develop fast and have more pure motivation to seek profit. but the private enterprises's status is inequal compared with the state-owned enterprises, the country's many policies tilt to the state-owned enterprises. Thus, private enterprises find ways to improve relations with the government, the phenomenon of private entrepreneurs's political participation is particularly prevalent in recent years. Political relations between private enterprise and non-political relations of private enterprises have the different degree of changing the toward of funds. With the advance of the market process, we found that companies's profit-seeking motives become more clear, and people's moral standards seems to be decreased, profit-seeking motives to strengthen and the decline in moral standards make companies be more unease. In this paper, for the period 2002-2005, China's listed companies issued A shares as the research object, we analyze how the different degrees of moral hazard of different enterprises and how the process of China's market-oriented impact on the corporate performance in the dual principal-agent contracts between inverstors and enterprise as well as business and regulatory agencies with the principal-agent theroy.By empirical research, we get the following conclusions:1,The probability and estent of changing the toward of funds and the state-owed enterprise is negatively related,while The probability and estent of changing the toward of funds and private enterprise has positive correlation.This shows that the moral hazard of private enterprises is higher than the government-controlled enterprises.There is still a long way to go before china which is in the process of transition building the mature legal syetem. in the case of imperfect legal system, China's economy is still roaring, a good momentum of development, there must be an alternative mechanism to work, "government control"is one such alternative mechanism which we give some proof in this article.2,Compared to the local eterprises,the central enterprises have the lower probability and estent of changing the toward of funds.this is because the central enterprises receive the stingent regulation than the the local enterprise,more emphasis on its image.and the local government give greater intervention for their good performance and have more serious moral hazard.3,From the average in the descriptive statistics,political-connected privat company have the higher probability and estent of changing the toward of funds than the none political-connected privat company. From a single variable analysis,the difference of the probability and estent of changing the toward of funds between political-connected privat company and none political-connected privat company is not significant. From the regression results, the none political-connected privat company has the stronger motivation to chang the toward of funds,while the political-connected privat company has the greater estent to chang the toward of funds. Both before and after the tests would seem to be paradox. This is related to the different ways to obtain the political status. This complex relationship has led to bias our test results.4,The degree of marketization and the probability and estent of changing the toward of funds is positive related. This shows that market-oriented reforms have brought a certain degree of moral decline, there is a more serious moral hazard.Although the process of law is advancing along with the marketization,the formal syetem play a role need the help of informal system such as credibility,ethics. informal system such as credibility,ethics,is even more inportant.From our empirical results and research findings, we can get the following policy implications:First, ensure supervision of central enterprises the same time,strength the regutaion to the local government control enterprise and private enterprise in using the funds.because from our study,we can see,compared to the local eterprises, the central enterprises have the lower probability and estent of changing the toward of funds. Therefore, the local government control enterprises and private enterprises should be more stringent regulatory bodies as the object of supervision.Secondly, to strengthen the moral construction, cultivate a good social moral standards. For the transition countries, while we accelerate the establishment of a mature legal system, focusing on ethics, and reputation and the role of the informal system. Because "reputation mechanism" is also one of the mechanisms under the imperfect alternative system.Previous research literature only from the company's own characteristics, such as company size, corporate governance mechanism, the company's financial condition, etc. to study the use of funds. This opens up a research perspective, that is, analyze the agent of moral hazard and institutional environment on the impact of changes to the fund, creatively constructed two-tier principal-agent contract among investors,regulatory agencies and business enterprises. and to explore business as an agent different moral hazard effect on their performance. And the proof of the positive role of government regulation, provides empirical evidence for a few research literatures about government regulation's positive affert.verify the great importance of imformal system such as credibility,ethics under the transition and inperfert syetem in china.Of course,the paper may do good to the policy making,... |
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