Game And Win-Win Situation Between The Enterprise And The Bank

In China, the main mode of financing for SMEs is still indirect financing, namely, by way of loans to banks for funding. However, as the existence of information asymmetry between the enterprises and the banks, resulting in the occurrence of credit risk of commercial banks,posing a great threat to the banks'profitability and level of asset structure and security, as well as bank credit, and control of other risks. In addition, last year,the U.S. sub-prime crised, making the credit risk of commercial banks in China are increasingly affected by social concerns. For the control of the increase on non-performing loans, most commercial banks are in a "credit crunch" phenomenon to control potential risks. This will result in breaking the chain of funds business customers, while corporate customers break the chain of funds is bound to lead to a series of "domino" effect, in which commercial banks are the first victims.Information asymmetry is mainly reflected in the adverse selection and moral hazard, this thesis study the relationship between banks and enterprises in a moral perspective, including banks outside the credit risk of moral hazard moral hazard and bank's internal risk of moral hazard, the external moral hazard is divided into three categories, one category is the borrower breach of loan agreements, in private to change the use of funds; second category is to hide investment income borrowers to escape debt service obligations; the third category is the borrower not to benefit as the goal to maximize the use of loans. Internal moral hazard refers to the commercial bank, bank decision-making, management, business layers know these acts or omissions inconsistent with the commercial banks and the long-term interests, however, that such act or omission may not be found or even if they are found to the damages caused by less than the benefits, but formed the risk of decision-making. At present, scholars at home and abroad to prevent moral hazard within the measures and methods have reached a consensus on the basic, such as improving governance mechanisms, ownership structure reconstruction, optimizing executives incentives and constraints, the establishment of audit and loan officers and so the vertical management system can effectively Control and prevention of internal moral hazard. In reality, enterprises seek to maximize their own interests to take hidden actions or hidden information behavior and commercial banks continued to carry out game, so outside bank moral hazard is the most difficult to control and prevention. How to prevent an external moral hazard and to achieve win-win situation if there is a possibility and should be discussed how to achieve the focus of this article.This study is divided into five major ideas, the first part of the study of the general theory of moral hazard, including the definition of moral hazard and type of proposed moral hazard refers to people engaged in economic activities to maximize the effectiveness of the promotion itself is not conducive to others when you make a behavior, and is a difficult behavior was found hidden. The content from the asymmetry of view, moral hazard types are divided into hidden action moral hazard and hidden information moral hazard. The principal agent in order to make the wishes of their own actions, must devise an incentive contract to induce the agent from their own interests the most favorable choice of the principal action. Then the major developed countries on current practices in preventing the risk of moral thinking, as well as some well-known scholars of China's research explained. The United States from a long time mainly depends on inspection and monitoring, as well as the regulatory requirements of capital and risk-based deposit insurance premium rate, turned to a strong judicial system to strengthen the penalties against those responsible, including criminal prosecution, and will be classified as "without financial Industry welcomes the person "responsible person ever expelled from the financial system. In the rescue, the rescue of the criteria are becoming increasingly strict, strict market-exit policy-only a temporary liquidity crisis, banks appear to provide support, while the right has been trapped in a liquidity crisis in banks will not support; right bank crisis allowed the shareholders actually bear the losses caused by the banking crisis, while replacement of its management; of financial institutions to manage the introduction of a risk-based insurance system, and the progressive introduction of non-full deposit insurance, to enhance depositors, especially the big the amount of depositor's risk awareness and the implementation of supervision of banks active;European Union countries to prevent and control the financial risk of moral hazard is mainly outside the central bank or supervisory authority of moral hazard of commercial banks to external regulation; Japan and punishment from a strict system guarding against both financial moral hazard. In China, scholars more commercial banks within the study of moral hazard and precautionary measures such as improving governance mechanisms, ownership structure reconstruction, optimizing executives incentives and constraints, the establishment of audit and credit personnel vertical management system, and it is studied the three aspects of society one by one.The third part is the study of game theory in moral hazard behavior under the bank-enterprise credit. Firstly, analysis of the relationship between banks and enterprises of game theory applied to the analysis of the feasibility studies, detailing description of the four kinds of game theory models, including complete information static game, dynamic game of complete information, incomplete information static game, dynamic game of incomplete information. Then proposing the game theory applied to the idea of bank-enterprise credit behavior analysis and an analysis of China's credit market between banks and enterprises on the repayment period of the dynamic game, the game between banks and enterprises comes to a balanced solution, so as to come to safeguard bank debt to increase penalties against corporate defaults for banks to reduce credit risk and economic development which are very favorable, and thus a win-win between banks and enterprises putting forward a real possibility.The fourth part by reference to equity financing, that is, companies raise funds from institutional investors channel, borrowing a number of assumptions to build a win-win model between banks and enterprises, respectively, the establishment of enterprises, banks and investment institutions of the revenue function and related constraints, the use of pull-grange, respectively, a function derived utility function of their respective maximum. This selection of 50 small and medium enterprises in 2008 yield data, the use of Excel tools find the moral hazard and businesses, banks and investment institutions the relationship between the expected utility, namely, the expected utility of all the three with an increased risk of corporate ethics and the lower We also find that banks and enterprises to achieve win-win situation between the theoretical availability, in the enterprise of moral risk factor of 0.2-0.3 between the point of intersection, indicating the possibility of existence of win-win situation. However, due to the above-mentioned banks and enterprises and win-win theory, the reality of the difficulty of the operation, this article Part V in respect of commercial banks and enterprises to make some practical measures and recommendations for action. For commercial banks, it is necessary to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanisms, including the design of credit contracts with incentives, respectively, from the incentive effects of interest rate reverse mortgages, positive incentive effects of prior commitments made to encourage, as well as severe pre-described four aspects of punitive intent. At the same time, from the signing restrictive contracts, the establishment of mechanisms to track and manage the banks involved in three aspects of corporate governance mechanisms which discussed in restraint mechanism design. The second is to engage in financial product innovation, and design the right products to meet small and medium enterprises and service credit from commercial banks to invest in by the injection of large enterprises, adjusted to the financing of small and medium enterprises to be tilted in order to explore new profit growth point; the same time learn from the financial services sector of the SME finance innovations (such as Standard Chartered Bank for SMEs launched in Chongqing, unsecured small loans will be mainly invested manufacturing enterprises, trading enterprises, retail enterprises, service enterprises, Chongqing enterprises just to meet the operating time, operating the amount of such conditions, does not require any collateral items, you can access to bank loans, loan companies can monthly loan repayment of loans; China Merchants Bank's "Golden Logistics Finance" is from the small and medium enterprises in the supply chain inventory SME financing difficulty cracking the starting predicament; Shenzhen Development Bank announced pledge of warehouse receipts are also imported goods from the enterprise perspective of the supply chain to provide short-term financing to businesses.) launching to adapt to the status of finance products for SMEs;another bank should vigorously carry out consulting and other financial services businesses, For example, information consulting and financial consulting. For enterprises, it is necessary to explore new financing channels, and change the traditional reliance on bank credit which is only financing model, increasing commodity and trade finance, equity financing mode. Second, we need to nurture corporate credit philosophy to enhance SME credit literacy. Developing the concept of corporate credit for SME entrepreneurs, the key is to enhance the credit idea, asking for SME entrepreneurs must practice strict self-discipline, and enhance the credibility of its own personality. In addition, the article separately from complete SME credit evaluation mechanism, setting up its punishment mechanism, and SME credit information disclosure mechanism to three systems for SME credit culture formation.The contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in two aspects, firstly, putting forward a game theory applied to China's credit markets, and moral hazard studies;secondly, putting forward to the theory of banks and enterprises to achieve win-win avail ability and realistic suggestions for actions.Innovations of this article are three, firstly, in the presence of moral hazard, of course, between the bank and the enterprise there is the inevitable losses,mading on this basis to achieve win-win situation between the two possibilities. Secondly, by increasing the equity financing channel, namely the establishment of enterprises, banks and investors among the revenue functions, using Lagrange function and related parameters constrained to seek for the maximum utility among the obtained business and Bank, risk factor in the moral is between 0.2-0.3 to achieve win-win possibilities. Thirdly, making some actual operation feasibility of measures and proposals for China's commercial banks and enterprises to achieve win-win...