Research On Designing Mechanism For Banks To Supervise Logistics Enterprises In Unified Credit Mode

The third party logistics enterprises have an advantage of getting more information about money-borrowing enterprises and pledge, so the banks let logistics enterprises take charge of credit business in the unified credit inventory mode. This mode is widely used in practice, because it simplifies the loan process, reduces the credit risk of banks, helps the logistics enterprises get extra financial services revenue. But due to the asymmetric information, the banks in the mode will face the risk of converse selecting such as receiving false materials, and the moral hazard such as defaulting on loans. However, in matters of risk management problems of the unified credit inventory business, most existing literatures place their emphasis on money-borrowing enterprises and pledge, seldom study logistics enterprises. Based on this, in order to further guard against financial risks, this paper mainly focuses on the risk control problems of logistics enterprises in the unified credit model, the main contents are as follows:1. Based on the adverse selection risk of logistics enterprises, this paper designs an access mechanism. First of all, considering the ability of pledge regulatory and financial services, the logistics enterprises are divided into three risk levels, then using the signal game theory to analyze the behavior of logistics enterprises and get the separating equilibrium conditions:increasing the disguised cost of logistics enterprises and reducing the difference of pledge value between different types of logistics enterprises. Secondly, on the basis of separating equilibrium, the paper takes the quality as a sign to build a logistics enterprises profit forecast model, which can provide decision-making basis for banks to choose high quality logistics enterprises.2. Based on the moral hazard of logistics enterprises, this paper designs a supervision mechanism. In order to prevent default risk, default penalty model is built firstly. The model sets a reasonable risk bearing ratio to maximize the effort level of logistics enterprises, and analyzes the influence that logistics enterprises qualifications, rate of interest, credit line, pledge liquidity and loan-to-value ratios have on equilibrium outcome. Then in order to improve the participation dynamics of logistics enterprises, motivation model is built to get optimal profit sharing coefficient and effort level. Finally, the combination of punishment and incentive model can make up the shortcomings of the first two, improve the participation dynamics of both banks and logistics enterprises, then a mutual cooperation in the long-term win-win will be achieved.