The Game Analysis On Mechanism And It's Optimization Of Introducing Professional Executive To Family Business

After 30 years of rapid development, China's family business has become the main force of economic development. However, at the current, the family business are faced with a dilemma that if the family business do not break away from the family management system, they will not work, but if they bring the professional executive into the business, they will think that there are lack of reliable professional executive. For professional executive, it is hard to do a decision to enter the family business, and if they entered, it is difficult to do work after entering. Therefore, a number of professional executive choose to leave the family business. This phenomenon makes the cooperate willingness reduced. In that case, how to generate the dilemma that Chinese family business faced? What barriers exist if family business introduced and employed professional executive? At this stage, how to integrate and optimize the relationship between the family business and professional executive effectively? These are the main problems studied in this thesis.Firstly, This thesis introduces the concept,characteristics and development of family business and professional executive, and theoretical basis of the introduction of professional executive and trust in principal-agent. Secondly, the thesis analysis cost and effectiveness that the introduction of the professional executive. At this base, it analysis the efficiency of labor division,economies scale,incentive cost,supervision cost and residual loss for the introduction of professional executive. Then, it gets a conclusion that the introduction of professional executive is feasibility. Thirdly, the thesis introduces the principal-agent model of the family business and professional executive, and using the game analysis, it does the researches that are supervision, not supervision, incentives strategy. At the last, it gets conclusions family business choose the optimal ratio of the investigation, a moderate penalties, the appropriate proportion of supervision and the inevitability of choice. At the same time, for the Shanxi Coking Group Co. Ltd. example, it gives a case study to certificate.However, the introduction of professional executive is not successful. At the basis of the perspective of game theory, the thesis analysis that the nature of this situation is the lack of trust. In order to avoid the risk of serious loss, the family business choose the low-trust to professional executive. In order to avoid his high degree of loyalty did not return, professional executive choose a low cooperative behavior. Further, the thesis brings the probability that the family business choose the high-risk strategy into the dominant game model and finds that the outcome of the game depends on the probability and expected return, so as to get a pair of game theory main line for optimizing the family business and balanced professional executive, and take the Jili and Prince Edward Holdings Group for example to verify. The thesis also analyses that trust risk of the family business and professional executive is missing the confidence-building security system and the thesis build a stage game equilibrium model about family business and professional executive. It will give a idea for further research.