Trust Choice Behavior Of Family Business Owners And Professional Managers

Family business is an organization that exists widely in the world and has made important contributions to the development of the world economy.In order to adapt to the increasingly complex market environment,the introduction of professional manager and the use of their rich and mature management experience to provide more professional support for family businesses have become a better strategic choice for many family businesses.However,due to the imperfect market of professional managers in China,and many family business owners cannot fully believe in professional managers,the problem of speculation between family business owners and professional managers is more prominent.However,there are few studies on trust choice behavior of family business owners and professional managers,and most of the existing literature analyzes trust choice behavior from a static perspective,but trust choice behavior is a constant game and constant change the process of trust selection behavior research from a static perspective cannot fully reflect the trust issues between family business owners and professional managers.In view of this,this paper uses dynamic evolution game theory,commission generation theory,and trust theory,and uses MATLAB numerical simulation tools to conduct simulation research,to analyze the trust-selection behavior of family business owners and professional managers.Simultaneously,from the internal supervision path—the supervision of professional managers by the board of directors and the external supervision path—the supervision of family business owners by the government supervision department,to analyze the forces that influence the behavior improvement of both parties.On this basis,relevant suggestions are proposed from the perspectives of family business owners,professional managers,corporate boards and governments to promote the improvement of behaviors of both parties and achieve mutual benefit.Finally,through the case of Gome Group's "Chen Huang's Controlling Rights Controversy",the behaviorevolution process between Gome Group Chen Xiao and Huang Guangyu and its impact were analyzed to verify the theoretical analysis results.The research results show that:(1)When the additional net income brought by the mutual trust between the family business owner and the professional manager is greater than the speculative income brought by one party choosing a trust strategy and the other party choosing a trust strategy and the initial level of trust is high,both parties tend to choose a trust strategy,and when the initial level of trust is low,both parties tend to choose a speculative strategy.The degree of initial trust has a significant impact on the outcome of the parties' choice of behavior.(2)When only one party chooses a trust strategy to obtain additional net income that is greater than the speculative strategy,or when both parties trust each other,the extra net income is less than the one that chooses a trust strategy and the other party chooses a speculative strategy.When returning,both parties tend to choose speculative strategies.(3)The possibility that family business owners and professional managers choose a trust strategy is positively related to the additional benefits that both parties choose to choose a trust strategy;It is negatively related to trust costs,speculative gains from speculative behavior,and losses suffered by the other's speculative behaviors.(4)The higher the cost paid by the company's board of directors to supervising professional managers,the less likely it is that professional managers will choose a trust strategy;The more incentives professional managers will have to maintain the trust strategy,and the more punishment they will be punished for maintaining a speculative strategy,the greater the probability that a professional manager will choose a trust strategy.(5)The greater the rewards that family business owners choose for the trust strategy,the punishment for speculative behaviors,the business losses,and the loss of reputation,the greater the likelihood that the family business owner will choose the trust strategy.