| Early supplier involvement can benefit the entire supply chain. Now today, technological innovation is one of the most important activities in development team. To study the best acts of decision-making under different situations under and the uncertainty caused by fluctuations in net profit, you can stimulate more investment in innovation among the members effectively. In this paper, with the differential game and the evolution of game, we study the technological innovation co-operation mechanism of early supplier involvement, and concern about the impact of team earnings under the uncertainty of development.The study mainly include two aspects: first, by studying the innovation mechanism that supplier and the manufacturer take at product development, we learn the team members can work out the stable solutions of cooperation through continuous learning and adjustment strategies.Then, the study of early supplier involvement in product development of technological innovation cooperation mechanism, building suppliers and manufacturers of Non-cooperative game, Stackelberg cooperative game, Nash cooperative game. Game members obtained the optimal level of innovation investment and the corresponding benefits, in the absence of the outside world of uncertainty, Nash cooperative game equilibrium solution better than the other game models. Followed, I study the uncertain innovation performance how to affect the behavior and net profit of the members of the team. Research conclusions indicate the selection strategy, taking into account not only the expectations of net profit, taking into account the volatility of earnings. When the two kinds of strategies of cooperation, when net profit or less, Nash cooperative game there is no obvious superiority of the net profit when the big gap between the two may be preferred Nash cooperative game. That would take into account the risks, but also considered the benefits can be more conducive to increase the stability of the team. |
PDF Full Text Request