Subject Behavior Analysis In The Hazardous Chemical Safety Production And Supervision Based On The Game Theory

In recent years,the frequent occurrence of hazardous chemical accidents has seriously damaged the healthy operation of the national economy and the safety of people's lives and property.How to curb the tendency effectively and improve the level of the supervision of hazardous chemicals has aroused a wide discussion.For hazardous chemical enterprises,government regulators,and the third-party supervision institutions are all the parties that directly involved in the supervision work of hazardous chemical production,the research for their decisions is contribute to reduce the probability of safety accidents,strengthen safety management consciousness and enhance the level of safety management.Based on this background,this paper discusses the game relations among hazardous chemical enterprises,the government and the third-party supervision agencies according to the game theory.At first,based on the background of the gathering of enterprises in the chemical industrial park,and considering the probability of accidents under normal circumstances and the probability of accidents caused by the negative externalities among enterprises,the safety investment decision-making model among enterprises of hazardous chemicals is constructed.The results show that the decision of safety investment is inversely proportional to the production cost and the probability of accidents caused by negative externalities,and directly proportional to the profit of goodwill and accident penalty.Next,because government can make an influence on enterprise'performance,on the basis of the former part of the study,the government is joined as a forward,and based on the game relation between government regulators and enterprises,the sequential game model is built to analyze how government regulators to develop the random sampling strategy in the case of limited resources.The result shows that the local government should treat the enterprises with kindness and power.On the one hand,government should pay attention to the reasonable setting of the number of fines;on the other hand,government should set a reasonable proportion of spot checks.Finally,considering the synergistic regulatory effect of the third-party supervision institution,it is introduced into the game model,and the government policy regulation is added into the evolutionary game model between the hazardous chemical enterprises and the third-party institution as a parameter.Through a series of analysis,the government can regulate the safe production behavior of enterprises and the third-party organizations by formulating a set of reasonable financial subsidies and supervision fines,then,the ultimate goal of maintaining the safe production and stability of the chemical industry will be achieved.