Non-coal Mine Safety Supervision Game Theory

Although the non-coal mine accidents in China is to down, but major accidents have occurred from time to time, production safety situation is still grim. Well, inefficient production safety supervision is one of the important reasons. The main reason for this situation is that the interests of the parties who involved in non-coal mine production safety supervision system have discrepancy, which leading to conflicts of interest. All the relevant parties are for the sake of their own interests, it will negative in production safety supervision. Based on this background, this article will use the game theory and evolutionary game theory as an analysis tool for non-coal mine safety, to reveal the reason of non-coal mine safety supervision inefficient. It will provide effective countermeasure for the non-coal mine safety supervision.Firstly, this article analyzes the regulatory status of non-coal mine safety in China, raised the problem of the safety supervision system. The theoretical basis of the demonstration of safety supervision:externalities, asymmetric information, lack of social responsibility. Secondly, according to the actual situation of the current non-coal mine safety supervision system constructed government-non-coal mining enterprises game and evolutionary game model, then discuss the general and the existence of rent-seeking. The results of discussion and analysis is the solving the Nash equilibrium, copy dynamic equations and Evolutionary Equilibrium. Then build the game model for the mining enterprises internal security incentives and construct a game simulation safe behavior among mine workers. Finally, come up with some countermeasures and suggestions to improve our non-coal mine safety supervision system.This article provides a way of the solution to the current problem of non-coal mine safety supervision, which is suited to explore the mechanism applicable to non-coal mine safety supervision system in China.The main innovations of this paper are:using of game theory and evolutionary game theory to discuss the existence of rent-seeking conditions under the government and the mining enterprise safety; using game theory, combined principal-agent theory incentive analysis of mining enterprises internal security; using multi-agent simulation software to simulate the behavior of the evolution of the production safety of the mine workers.