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Decision And Coordination Models Of Supply Chain Under Fairness Preference And Risk-averse Based On The Sale Effort

Posted on:2017-01-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330488955723Subject:Operational Research and Cybernetics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the tide of economic globalization, the traditional competition mode among enterprises has been transformed into chain-to-chain competition mode. Supply chain management has become the focus of the academic and the business. Therefore, in reality, in order to improve the whole performance of the supply chain, the manufacturers and retailers have to pay their own efforts. Also, with the fast improvement of technology update and personalized demand, in the current random market environment, products update more frequently so that the demands of more and more products become uncertain. In addition, the existence of the behavioral factors like risk preference and fairness preference makes people do not always maximize their profits, which leads to a new research direction in the study of supply chain contract.Firstly, this paper studies the supply chain system, which is composed of a retailer that has a fairness preference and makes sales efforts and a fairness neutral manufacturer. The fairness preference behavior of retailer is introduced into the pricing decision model of the supply chain. Under the assumption that the retailer has advantageous inequity distribution case and disadvantageous inequity distribution case, and each case is divided into two scenarios:manufacturer considers retailer’s fairness preference and manufacturer doesn’t considers retailer’s fairness preference, the corresponding optimal decision models of the manufacturer and retailer are developed, respectively. Finally, the numerical example is presented to illustrate the model.Then, by assuming that the stochastic demand is influenced by combined sales efforts, this paper establishes a supply chain coordination model with a risk-averse retailer and risk-neutral manufacturer under the addition and multiplication demand forms, respectively. The influence of risk aversion on the optimal decision and coordination contract is discussed. And, under the addition form, a combined contract of buy back contract and cost sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain; under the multiplication form, however, a risk-averse coordination contract is designed to achieve supply chain coordination.
Keywords/Search Tags:fairness preference, risk averse, supply chain coordination, inequity distribution, stochastic demand
PDF Full Text Request
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