Under The Wto Agreement On Agriculture, China's Agricultural Policy Adjustments

Based on a thorough study of the formation mechanism, its changing trace and effect of the WTO agricultural rules, this thesis firstly find out conflicts between the China agricultural policies and the WTO agricultural rules then provide a scheme of adjustment on agricultural policies in China.At first, the move effect of the WTO agreement on agriculture is analyzed by econometrics model and general statistical analysis technique from its effect on agricultural policies of different member countries and the situation of its implementation. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the WTO agreement on agriculture has certain effect on agricultural policies of member countries, but the effect on their core policies is limited. (2) It is roughly implemented, but its efficiency is influenced by some factors.Secondly, the paper set up a national behavior model of agricultural policy adjustment, testifying those corresponding hypothesis in terms of various nation's behavior of agricultural policy adjustment restrained by the WTO agreement on agriculture. The results show that although various countries have similar objective in agricultural policy adjustment, their behavior fashion is not always similar. A strong and great country in agricultural trade principally make the active adjustment, meanwhile make the passive adjustment less, and can modify "game rules" to attain its aim of strategic adjustment when necessary. However, a weak and small country in agricultural trade chiefly implemented the passive and submitted adjustment. Of course, the country can actively adjust those policies suitable for national long-range benefits, but can not set some exceptional articles on its own to ensure the special interest in this country. Despite which kind of country meets conflicts in agricultural policies, it normally analyses the cost and benefit of every adjustment, decide whether or how to adjust before it is able to maximize the national interest, which shows the domestic principal interest group.Thirdly, the study identifies and classifies conflicts between WTO agricultural rules from various angles and description of major features on agricultural policies in China. The result shows that there does not exist so many conflicts, which general people imagined, between a series of special arrangements of agricultural policies in China and WTO agricultural rules. The major researches gave more cares for direct and obvious rule conflicts, but did not emphasize enough those concealed system conflicts. In a series of rule conflicts, the weak ones are mainly exposed, and the strong ones are not appeared so much. The former mainly includes these conflicts: background differences between transformed economy and market economy, tariff of agricultural products, import quota, state trade, VAT institution, inspection institution of import commodity, protection price of grains, agricultural inputs subsides, and SPS institution. The later chiefly contains some conflicts in import & export license institution, management qualification of foreign trade, and corn export subsides.At last, aiming at the above conflicts, the thesis respectively proposes a scheme for policy adjustment of Chinese agriculture from strategic and tactful angles. It contains the guidance thinking and fundamental principles of agricultural policy adjustment in China, strategic adjustment suggestion to dissolve system conflicts progressively, tactful adjustment suggestion to abolish a series of concrete conflicts in agricultural policies, and countermeasures to participate in multilateral negotiation of agricultural trade in "development ground".