State-owned Holding Company To Take Over The Board Of Supervisors And Management Performance

This paper is based on the reality of China's institutional background and the characteristics of the listed companies' controlling-shareholders changing. Taking 119 Chinese state-controlled listed companies which have experienced control right transferring during 2002～2003 as research samples, adopting the method of the same industry matching comparison, taking the changing of board of supervisors after takeover as the beginning of this research, and choosing ROE(return on equity) as he benchmarks of measuring operating performance, the paper studied the takeover and its impact on the board of supervisors and operating performance.First, after control right transferring of state-controlled listed companies, the operating performance has been improved, and the effect of control right transferring is efficient. But this improvement is decreasing gradually, which explicit that Chinese control right transferring has not changed the mechanisms of corporate governance and improve the operating performance completely. Its pursuit for short-term goals -Back-door listing and protecting "shell" -is very conspicuous.Second, takeover lead to the change of the board of supervisors and these changes are reflected in a series of features of the board of supervisors. such as. the number of the supervisors reducing, the times of meeting hold by the board of supervisors increasing, and the replacement of the director of the board of supervisors, which explicit that the mechanism of takeover could promote the structure of corporate governance to perfect.Third, after control right transferring, the changes of the board of supervisors made no difference in promoting operating-performance between the samples and their matching company. The times of meeting hold by the board of supervisors and the director of the board of supervisors have no impact on the corporate operating performance. Although the 5-person board of supervisors' listed companies' operating performance are better than the 3-listed companies' in the short run, considering the weak position of the board of supervisors in today's China, it can be concluded that the size of the board of supervisors can not impact the listed companies' operating performance.The research results suggest that Chinese should further improve the market for corporate control, and reduce the intervention on corporate control right transferring, and strengthen the efficiency of the market mechanism, so let the corporate control right market play its role freely on promoting the efficiency of corporate governance; Also, through legislation and enhancing the overall quality of supervisors, and introducing independent supervisors and incentive mechanism for supervisors, and other means to strengthen the role of the board of supervisors, and promote the corporate governance structure to perfect.