Power Industry Incentive Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information

China's great economical achievements thanks to the reform and opening-up policy establishined for three decades has attracted worldwide attention,but the regulatory reform of traditional natural monopoly industries(such as electricity,railways,tap water, telecommunications,etc.) is also faced with a crucial breakthrough.These industries is related to people's livelihood,directly influence social welfare,its reform is a worldwide difficult problem.In the West,with the rise of deregulation,government's regulatory activities represents the tendency to coordinate with market mechanisms,however,the entry of market mechanisms also enhanced the transaction between government and enterprises,asymmetry information constrain the efficiency of the regulation;In China,with the shift from intensity regulation to mild regulation,government also facing same problem,namely,in the new information structure,constraints and optional instrument, how to design a contract mechanism to stimulate enterprises consider social welfare while pursuing profitable goal,and to achieve the optimal regulatory system,especially the optimal price regulation,this subject is exactly what I am interested in.This paper focus on power industry,begin with a series of practical problems caused by current regulation,made a deep analysis and found that asymmetric information is the main reason.Traditional regulation founded on perfect information assumption,on the premise of asymmetric information,the incentive regulatory theory regard regulation as a principal-agent problem,to deal with these abstract questions at the basis of operationable assumptions on modeling,exert quantitative analysis,welfare analysis and the adoption of strict logic,and then draw to the optimal solution(or second-best solution),in comparison with the actual market results,finally looking for effctive policies and measures to improve social welfare through government intervention,and thus provide a way to start this study. According to Electricity industry chain,this study is divided into three parts:generation aspect,transmission and distribution aspect and sale aspect.The main subject of the first two parts is price level regulation,the last one is price structure regulation.Contradictions between the coal and electricity lit the fuse of the starting the reformation of electricity price regulation system;the unfair price bidding indicate the existence of adverse selection problem in power generation aspect;the serious moral hazard problem generated in price regulation of transmission and distribution aspect attribute this aspect to be the focus of the study;price structure in the electricity sale aspect does not meet the principles of Ramsey pricing;separately setting up the adverse selection and moral hazard incentives model,we can achieve general conclusions on how to realize the best or second-best solution,use current foreign incentive regulation model for reference,in power generation aspect,take ROR improved by information rent as the basic regulation method;a combination design of DEA-based YCR and PCR United ROR in transmission and distribution aspect;apply Ramsey pricing principles to improve price structure in electricity sale aspect;also proposes strengthening the related laws and regulations and build a unified,coordinated regulatory system and so on.