Accounting Information Of Listed Companies To Disclose Non-compliance Regulatory Effectiveness Of Research

China's Capital Market has seen numerous relevant incidents of disclosing false accounting information springing up one after another during its development of only ten old years. These incidents largely shook the Capital Market. Disclosed irregularities including false statement, delayed revealing, and important missing of accounting information have, given severe impact to the normal operation of stock market at different levels, and meanwhile eroded investors'confidence and impaired their interests as well. Currently, in China's stock market, irregularities are still not under good control so that the effectiveness of supervision are not well resolved, either. Namely, the effectiveness of supervising the information disclosure of listed company is not reliable. As a result, it is still quite necessary for the relevant supervision institutions to supervise the information disclosure of listed company, with the effectiveness of supervision to be improved, and especially that of information disclosure to be further reviewed.Based on 451 punishment cases between the year 2000 to 2008, in which 280 listed companies were punished by supervision institutions for their irregularities in information disclosure, this paper, using descriptive statistics method, analyzes irregularity types and punishment types of information disclosure of listed companies in stock market, and presents the overall state of irregularities and punishments of information disclosure of listed companies. Then, from the three aspects of deterrence of punishment, time-effectiveness and opportunity for re-financing, this paper further discusses the effectiveness of supervision of information disclosure in China's stock market. That is, using deterrence of punishment, which is, re-punishing the punished companies, to prevent recommitment, using time-effectiveness to evaluate the possibilities of supervision institutions finding out the false acts of listed companies in time, using opportunity for re-financing to analyze the operation of punished companies in Capital Market to determine the effectiveness of punishment from supervision institutions.Results of study shows that from the perspective of deterrence, there is still limits in effectiveness of supervision institutions supervising irregularities in information disclosure, due to the failure of deterrence to the punished listed companies of"not doing it again". However, in different means of punishment, penalty is of certain deterrence. From the perspective of time-effectiveness, the supervision of irregularities in information disclosure from stock exchange is more effective than that of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). From the perspective of opportunity for re-financing, as for capability and opportunity of re-financing, the punished companies are weaker than the non-punished companies. Means of penalty, instead of warning and circulating a notice of criticism, influences a company'capability and opportunity of re-financing. Herefrom, in conclusion, this paper suggests some policies and measures to improve the effectiveness of supervision including reinforcing the overall planning and supervising role of the CSRC, bringing the stock exchange into full play in its real-time supervision function, strengthening the supervision of supervision institutions, intensifying both regular supervision and market supervision and forming the competitive mechanism of survival of the fittest.