Established Operators The Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms Compatible With The State-owned Enterprises

How to motivate and constrain the manager of enterprise is an advanced subject in the field of modern firm theories. It has important theoretical value and practical meaning to solution for long-term development of enterprise because of the separation between ownership and control, especially to the problem caused by the asymmetrical information between owner and manager.In this thesis, we take State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) as the research object, through analyzing the relations between principal and agent in SOE, and study incentive and constraint to manager by utilizing basic microeconomic theories such as Information Economics, The Theory of Incentives, The Theory of Contracts, Principal-Agent Theory. Our study goes on from four aspects, as following:First, we systematically introduce the western modern enterprise theoretical research accomplishment for the problem of incentive and constraint to manager. Though these research accomplishments make the capitalist private system as their premise, we can learn from their ways and methods for studying the problem of incentive and constraint to manager in SOE.Secondly, we elaborate the incentive and constraint mechanism of SOE to manager at present in our country, particularly analyze the basic conditions and the existing problems in the operation of yearly paid system and stock option system in some firms. We conclude that the existing problems of incentive and constraint to manager in SOE come from the departure from the SOE's features.Thirdly, we make an analysis of the difference between SOE and NSOE (Non-State-Owned Enterprise) and draw a conclusion that SOE distinguishes NSOE from such aspect as principal-agent relationship, the decision of principal's purpose, the way of agent's behavior. The state as SOE's principal makes an influence on the problem of incentive and constraint, which include not only the principal problem, but also the agent problem. The main effect is that: on the one hand, probably take the multiple goals into the firm; on the other hand, do no good to prevent their collusion when the state entrusts the supervisor to supervise the manager.Fourthly, base on the systematical study and aiming at the actual condition of theSOE in our country, we give some suggestions on the establishment of effective mechanism of incentive and constraint to manager in SOE.Through studying systematically, we think that SOE has many special features different from NSOE. This determines that it can't be imitated the theoretical model of west county to build the effective mechanism of incentive and constraint to manager in SOE, we should learn from their successful experience and do it according to the SOE's feature in our country.