China's Listed Companies' Governance Structure And Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms

Reform of State-owned Enterprises, because of its importance and complexity, has been the central problem of Reform and Open in China, and , at present, it has been forwarded into a key period of institutional innovation and cracking stage, and further how to improve the corporate governance is of the most importance. In this paper, relevant theories of corporate governance are used to present main factors influencing corporate governance in China and to give correspondent solution to main problems in it and incentive-constraint mechanism of listed companies. According to the structure of this paper, there are five chapters: Chapter 1 is the preface; the main body is consisted of chapter 2, 3 and 4; Chapter 5 is the conclusion of this paper.Chapter 1.Preface. In this part the context of the paper and relevant concepts of corporate governance are stated, and the base for the following analyses is provided.Chapter 2. Analytical Means of Corporate Governance: Principal-agent Theory. Some problems in corporate governance in China, to which considerable attention should be paid, are induced by classical analysis and model analysis of principal-agent theory.Chapter 3. Present-state Analysis of corporate governance in Listed Companies in China. The author uses results of analyses in chapter 2 to point out main factors influencing corporate governance in listed Companies in China: shortcomings in principal-agent relationship of state-owned capital, irrationality in share structure, seriousness of insider's control and unsoundness of incentive-constraint mechanism.Chapter 4. Analysis of Solution to Corporate Governance in Listed Companies in China. In this Chapter, the author presents solutions to the directorate problems put in Chapter 3. mainly including: to multiply property-agents, to improve the share structure, to put insiders' control in control, to improve incentive-constraint mechanism by postponing contingent payment, to introduce the mechanism of outside supervisor, to enforce supervision of directorate board and control of supervision board, to establish manager market, to normalize security market, etc.nChapter 5. Conclusion. Main factors influencing corporate governance in listed companies in China and solutions to them are concluded in this chapter.