A Research On Asymmetric Information In Venture Capital

The theory of Asymmetric Information is the core of Information Economics. This dissertation directs to the asymmetric information in the venture capital institution and venture capital enterprise, and sets forth practical jprecaution mechanism in order to improve motion efficiency of Venture Capital institution and to strengthen its competitiveness . ;Above all, the theories of Asymmetric Information, consign- agent and Venture Capital are studied. Analysing the asymmetric information question in terms of information economics firstly, then point out that the problem of asymmetric information in the venture capital lies in the relation between principal and agent based on analysing the theory of consign-agent, Secondly, this dissertation ponders over the asymmetric information in venture capital overly. The asymmetric information in the venture capital institution and venture capital enterprise is brought forward in detajils, and the phenomena and reasons are analysed. Then , the mechanism against adverse selection and moral hazard is put forward.In the analyse of above all, the qualitative and quantitative j mechanism against adverse selection and moral hazard are analysed. As far as adverse selection, the seperated contract and scientific project screen are concerned. As far as moral hazard, the incentive and restriction mechanism are concerned.Lastly, the detailed measures to enhance symmetrical information include of setting up control subject status of venture capital institution), perfecting intermediary, building venture capital prestige mechanism and strengthening management of enterprise etc..