Economics Of The Chinese M & A Analysis

This thesis, with the tools and methods borrowing from Classical Economics, Systematic Economics, Law & Economics, etc., is devoted to the economic analysis of Chinese enterprises' M&A (Merger and Acquisition), tending to advance the theoretical research of M&A and to accelerate the standardization of Chinese enterprises' practice of M&A.In the very beginning, the paper introduces the definition of M&A, the commonly accepted classification of M&A, which includes horizontal M&A, vertical M&A and mixed M&A. Then follows the critics towards the Scale Economy Theory of Classical Economics, Transaction Cost Theory of Systematic Economics and some mixed M&A theories.For the research into the motivity of Chinese M&A, the paper first put forward the features of contemporary M&A in China. After looking into the efficiency in three different M&A model with tools employing from Classical Economics, the paper encourages the M&A model which enhance efficiency. By examining the motivity of Chinese M&A, this paper also bring forward the supposition marking M&A into four phases.In the summarization and description of related viewpoint about M&A, this thesis presents a question, that is whether there is ultimate in M&A, builds up a simple boundary M&A model with the consideration of social average efficiency, illustrates the conditions of M&A based on cost-income model, concludes the positivecorrelation between enterprise's scale and efficiency and that the boundary of Chinese M&A is dynamic, but not an actual boundary.The only excuse for government's interference is that M&A may causes monopoly. For the analysis of M&A and monopoly, in a macro-level, monopoly is not absolutely irrational, because it also does help to bring macro-goal into realization, high employment rate and economy's development. In this sense, the paper suggests that government's interference into M&A depends on its influence towards general benefit, income; and the fulfillment of government's functions should mostly turn to laws.Reviewing the historical development of M&A theories in America, the paper believes standardizing M&A in China may adopt multiple methods and then compare their effects. The core of legislation is anti-monopoly against monopoly unreasonable price, against unbalanced fortune distribution.Chinese entrance of WTO influences our domestic M&A, thus, to limit foreign M&A in China is important, and Non-National Treatment might be sensible. Referring the limitation of foreign M&A in other countries, the paper offers some detailed clauses for Chinese to-be Anti-Monopoly Act. For the popular division in Chinese enterprises, the thesis expresses its skeptical suspicion: this might not be the best way.