Property Rights, Board Governance And Investment Efficiency

Investment decision in the finance company occupies the core position, investment efficiency reflects the effectiveness of resource allocation, directly affects the healthy growth of the company and sustainable development, and affects the quality and speed of economic and social growth. In recent years, low investment efficiency has always been the bottleneck of the development of enterprises. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance, is the key link between the balance of shareholders and operators, the board of directors can effectively run directly related to the development of enterprises, so the governance of the board of directors has a great impact on the efficiency of investment.Under the condition of enterprise common separation of ownership and managerial authority, between shareholders and managers of enterprise operating performance there are serious information asymmetry problem, as the agent of the operator for their own benefit its shareholders will deviate from the target to form a huge agent risk, in order to avoid this risk, the board of directors arises at the historic moment. The board of directors is the decision-making body of the company, is connected to the shareholders and management link, also is the core of the company’s internal governance. The board of directors can play a positive and effective role, directly about corporate investment behavior and resource allocation efficiency. Efficient and independent board of directors can inhibit the investment efficiency.Property right is the cornerstone of corporate governance. in this article Property rights mainly refers to the nature of enterprise control. We are a socialist country, the national conditions determine the assets of our country is generally divided into two categories, namely, public assets and private assets. By extension, our country enterprise is divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises two. The nature of the ultimate control of the enterprise is different, it is determined that there are many differences in the allocation of resources and economic consequences. In our country, the resource control of state-owned enterprises is the government, compared with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises have great advantages in resource and cost, and the allocation of resources directly affects the efficiency of investment. In addition, in terms of government subsidies, subsidies to state-owned enterprises are often greater than the private enterprise. Therefore, it is necessary to study the relationship between the board governance and investment efficiency, and help to improve the efficiency of investment in the corporate governance mechanism, and to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and promote the development of private enterprises.This article selects the entire a-share non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as research samples, with the characteristics of board governance scale, the proportion of independent directors, the chairman of the board of directors and general manager of both separation, director compensation and director ownership as the breakthrough point, combined with the nature of property rights, investigate their relationship with the investment efficiency. In this paper, the study found that the board size is significantly negative correlation with the efficiency of investment, expand the scale of the board of directors can be effective to improve the investment efficiency of the enterprise, and the state-owned enterprise to its inhibitory effect is better than that of private enterprises; The independent directors proportion can improve the phenomenon of excessive investment of listed companies, but not significantly, and inadequate investment has obvious inhibitory effect to the enterprise; Whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, director compensation can effectively improve the situation of excessive investment, inhibit underinvestment. Because at present our country board of directors of the listed company less common ownership, leading to excessive investment board shareholding and was not significant, but tests proved that the board shareholding and inadequate investment and significant negative correlation. Further study found that compared with private enterprises, the independent directors mechanism in the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises can be a very good curb overinvestment, board ownership of state-owned enterprises to improve the investment efficiency. Chairman and general manager, however, both separation and the efficiency of investment is not significant.