Advertising Model, Based On Differential Games Theory Of Supply Chain

This thesis deals with the topic of manufacturer and retailer's advertising in supply chain by differential games theory .We will study from the following three aspects:(1) . Equilibrium price and advertising ,(2) . A differential game of manufacturer and retailers advertise ,(3) . Dynamic cooperative advertising in many channels .We gain some different conclusions by selecting different objective functions and some new elements being considered because of the market structure's shift. Some of these conclusions are a extension of the pioneer's conclusions , some of these conclusions are reliable to modern industry's real need .In the first chapter , after introducing some basic notions , We give some new development on differential game theory and its application .In Chapter 2 deals with a channel of distribution in which a manufacturer supplies N retailers . First , It is assumed that(1). The retailer cumulative overall advertises and retailer's price has a impact at the retail outlet .(2). The manufacturer's advertising affects positively the brand image . Under the condition (1), (2) , We proposes the differential game model , then under conflict , Prices are set in a Stackelberg leader-follower fashion and dynamic advertising policies are designed as Markovian Nash equilibrium . Under coordination , we get the price and advertisement policies by optimal control theory . At last we compare the outcomes under conflict and coordination and analysis the reason .In Chapter 3 supposes that retailer promotions have negative impacts on the brand image , we study a question of manufacture advertise and retailer promotions in an infinite time . First, we give a differential game model;then we identify a no cooperative equilibrium of a differential game played with Markovian strategy and analyze the strategy .In Chapter 4 consider the problem in a channel with a single manufacturer and N retailers through brand image , local advertising expenditures , and sharing rules of advertising expenses . Four scenarios are considered . In the first , themanufacturer provides no support to the retailer's advertising , In the second , the manufacturer supports both types of retailer's advertising . In the remaining cases , the manufacturer supports only one of the two types of retailer advertising efforts .Our analysis of these options shows that sopporting both types of retailer advertising provides more profit to all channel members than any of the two cases of partial support . The latter is , however , better than no support .