Research On Pricing And Advertising Strategy In Asymmetric Dual-channel Supply Chain

An asymmetric dual-channel supply chain describes a supply chain where two retailers are asymmetric,specifically,the traditional offline retailer is dominant and the other retailer is weak.When the common manufacturer sells products through the retailers,the dominant retailer has power advantages over the weak one and even threats the manufacturer.The manufacturer usually adopts advertising to improve the goodwill of products so as to enhance sales and revenue.Besides,deciding on a proper pricing strategy is an important approach for firms to profit.In an asymmetric dual-channel supply chain,it is of great importance for each member to determine the respective pricing and advertising strategies to maximize profit.Therefore,studies on the pricing and advertising strategies in an asymmetric dual-channel supply chain are essential.This thesis firstly investigates the impacts of different pricing strategies of chain members on the supply chain efficiency.The respective equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies are derived by applying differential game theory to study the game between the manufacturer and the online retailer.Profit comparison results indicate that when the manufacturer sets a static wholesale price and the online retailer adopts a dynamic pricing strategy,the profits of the retailer and the chain peak;however,when both the retailer and the manufacturer apply dynamic pricing,the manufacturer benefits most.Secondly,this thesis researches the effects on the chain's property brought by the alliance between the manufacturer and the weak retailer.A game model between the manufacturer and the retailers is established.Results show that when the marginal effect of advertising on the market demand is comparatively significant,the alliance between the manufacturer and the weak online retailer is able to benefit the dominant retailer and the whole chain.