Study Of State-owned Enterprises Reform Of The Incentive Mechanism

Considering the importance and the recent theoretical research in thestate-owned enterprise's structure reform, it is obviously that the state-ownedenterprises always act as the mainstays of national domestic economy, this notonly because of its symbolic significance, but also because of its prominenteffects in economic developments and profound influnces in social changes.Though the structure reform of state-owned enterprises in China whichundergos nearly thirty years has solved the problem about ineffectiveoperation step by step, we still need to face a new puzzle of Principal-Agentrelationship with some rights separation between the owners and managers inthe state-owned enterprises.This article starts with the analysis of some opinions which are relatedto the debate about state-owned enterprise's efficiency. After that, we will getto the explanations of Principal-Agent theory and relevant problems. Basedon the Multi-task Principal-Agent Model, we can analyze the reason that leadto those internal Principal-Agent problems in state-owned enterprises, then itwill be followed with the probing of how to establishing a sound incentivemechanism according to the measure difficulty of enterprise's performance.