The Study On The Incentive And Restrictive Mechanism To Principal Of State-Owned Enterprises

Generally speaking, the two-decade-reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises is a process gradually recognizing the operational autonomy of enterprise and progressively contracting the compulsory administrative power, and is a process of establishment and perfection of the principal-agent relationship in SOE. Because of the special historical background, the principal-agent relationship is different between in Chinese state-owned and in western.At the present crucial period of reform of SOE, it is essential to improve efficiency of the principal-agent institution. In fact, the reform of SOE is aiming at resolving the low-efficiency of enterprises through the establishment of incentive and restrictive mechanism. But the problem is still serious in SOE, the fundamental reason is lacking of definite principal to responsible for the state-owned assets, lacking of effective incentive and restrictive mechanism to principal itself.This article is mainly expounds primary theories and concepts of western principal-agent theory, as well as the analysis from different economists. On this basis, combined with the present situation and characters of Chinese state-owned enterprises, propose the constructing and perfecting the incentive and restrictive mechanism to principal.