Game Analysis Of Micro-guaranteed Loans In Rural Credit Cooperatives

As the weak rural loan requirements in rural areas of China,farmers' loan has been conditioned to the rich of farmers and boom of rural economic . Since 1997, after the State formulated and promulgated the "Rural Credit Micro-Guaranteed Loans Interim Measures," the implementation of rural credit cooperatives of small guaranteed loans have simplified procedures to facilitate the farmers lending, in large measure to solve the difficult loan guarantees of farmers and high risk of bank credit ,and thus further promoted the rural industrial structure adjustment,so we can see rural credit cooperatives has played better support to the "three rural" development effectiveness of group guarantees while reducing the information asymmetry which caused by "adverse selection risk" and "moral hazard", and improving the repayment rate and the operational effectiveness of rural credit cooperatives.However, the current rural development of micro-guaranteed loans have encountered difficulties.The ratio of guaranteed loans did not continue to grow as expected in theory, but rises and falls, a great deal.Meanwhile, from the internal, external, historical and other factors, the asset quality of rural credit cooperatives deteriorated, far exceeded the proportion of non-performing assets. Such a high proportion of non-performing loans of rural credit cooperatives liabilities caused serious operational risks which increased largely, further reduced the formal financial sector to provide credit services for rural enthusiasm, serious threated to the survival and development of rural credit cooperatives, rural market mechanism and the allocation of resources ,and could not achieve "Pareto optimal",which was serious obstacle to rural economic development.How to solve the difficulties faced by the implementation process and the sustainable development of rural credit cooperatives?Many scholars have conducted in-depth study of guaranteed loans and the development of farmers carried out in-depth exploration.Research was abundant, but foreign scholars only had general theory of models, and could not solve the problem of China's actual guaranteed loans problem in rural areas .In China,the researches of guaranteed loans were most for tallying up of phenomenon and induce,and the factors about of inside living and outside living were not enough,didn't memtioned influence factor such as investment risk of the item, and lending rate...etc. thus could not availably guide the rise of guaranteed loans in our country.So it was necessary for us to do more research on the development and quantitative analysis of the relationship during these variables, and gave an answer why many farmers didn't want to join the group and commerce effectively . At the same time, how to reduce the bad loans in rural area,and rural credit market inefficiencies situation in China was also need for more in-depth discussions. These work were on the following :Firstly,the paper summarized the concept,traits,the loan condition and evolve in the process through collecting and sorting a lot of china loans, and used three examples to explain the need and urgency of rural financial reforms.Secondly, it analysed the model of evolutionary game theory and application deeply.As the rural credit cooperatives and credit farmers were limited rational, which was consistent with the hypothesis of evolutionary game, so this evolutionary game model was applied to small farmers guaranteed loans ,by removing important factors, applying loan interest rates, credit lines, joint and several liability, the risks of investment projects, establishing evolutionary game and getting revolutionary stable strategies based on the analysis of ratio of voluntary participation of farmers to guaranteed loans , by solving the evolutionary stability strategies.At last ,with the data of People's Bank of China, it also analysed the interest rates and the joint responsibility to the guaranteed loans and long-term evolutionary trends in the number of farmers.Finally, from the Principal-Agent perspective, the use of adverse selection model to analysis the reason and solution of non-performing loans in rural credit cooperatives and simultaneously using the moral hazard with hidden information model explained the influence of motivating factor for the loan quality, and obtained suggestions for the suppression of non-performing loans .