Analysis Of The Evolution Of The Relationship Between France And NATO

The relationship between France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (subsequently referred to as NATO) is the the most unique and complex between a western country and NATO. For over 60 years, France's relations with NATO experienced ups and downs and were actually closer than the appearance would suggest. In 1966, General de Gaulle declared, to everyone's surprise, that France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military institutions. When 43 years later, President Sarkozy announced in 2009 the full return of France to NATO, it again surprised the world. Both decisions have had far-reaching impact on the shape of international relations.2011 has been an eventful year for international relations, with an earthquke in China's eastern neighbour, turbulence to China's west and debt crises across the northern hemisphere. When unrest spread to Libya, France was quick to push for western action, which led to the eventual fall of the Gaddafi regime, rewrote history in Libya and affected the course of international relations. French activism, in contrast with the relatively low-key American response, marked a first since France's return to NATO and what local media called "a diplomatic victory for Sarkozy". From this, it is clear that NATO has quietly assumed more importance in France's strategic calculus and become a key platform for France to raise its international profile as a major power. People are naturally interested to know: was this greater platform a motivating factor behind France's eager return to NATO?Needless to say, relations between France and NATO, both past and present, have high academic value. The France-NATO relationship is much more than a bilateral relationship: it directly affects EU-NATO and France-US relations. It also has far-reaching impact on NATO transformation, EU common defence,Europe-US relations and the evolution of the international pattern. No systematic study has been made of this topic by Chinese scholars. Hence this paper, which is based on extensive access to archives as well as deep reflection and analysis.The first part of this paper provides an overview of France-NATO relations. Due mainly to its evolving characteristics, we divide the relationship into five phases: the primarily cooperative period of the Fourth Republic, military de-coupling under de Gaulle, slow and patient build-up under Pompidou, Giscard and Mitterrand, rapid advancement under Chirac and all-round restoration under Sarkozy. A summary is provided of each period to trace the evolution of France-NATO relations.The second part explores the internal dynamics of France-NATO relations and arrives at three conclusions. Firstly, the need to maintain France's great-power status is the decisive factor. Secondly, France-US relations is the most important external factor. Thirdly, the personality of French leaders is a factor that cannot be overlooked. This paper also identifies four reasons that prompted President Sarkozy to re-embrace NATO. Firstly, the changing international landscape and security situation. The comparative decline of western countries has caused Europe and NATO to strengthen unity, and NATO thus emerges as an important stage for French diplomacy. Secondly, adjustment in US foreign policy. President Obama has restored multilateralism, put more emphasis on cooperation with its allies, and shown some flexibility regarding NATO. Thirdly, the changes of NATO itself. NATO is transforming to reflect the changing international scene, and there is greater convergence with the strategic reorientation of French priorities. Fourthly, adjustment in French foreign policy. Based on Sarkozy's "relative power" theory, France is reorienting itself, at the core of which is the desire to improve France-US relations. The return to NATO is a key step of this adjustment.The third part analyses and predicts the ramifications of the French return for international relations. Firstly, the impact on NATO transformation should not be exaggerated. France hopes to have a say in NATO transformation and shape its strategic choices, yet the United States will not give up dominance of NATO. Secondly, the impact on European defence development is too early to tell. The French return will help address the doubts of other allies and reduce the obstacles to European defence development, yet it is only a ncessary - not adequate - condition for effective European defence and may spoil the outlook of European military integration. Thirdly, the impact on EU-NATO relations is positive yet modest. France, as part of NATO, can contribute more to the cooperative and complementary relations between the EU and NATO. However, as the United States will seek to maintain its control of Europe to serve its own global hegemonic goal and the EU will seek to break away from NATO and US control through greater internal unity and cohesion, the tension between them will not disappear for a long time to come. Fourthly, the long-term implication for the international pattern should be watched more closely. The French return means that western countries have become more closer in conceptual and military terms. This is a loss for the evolving multi-polar world and not necessarily a good thing for the ongoing "war on terror".To be more timely and relevant, this paper looks at the recent Libya conflict. We analyse the underlying reasons of French action and seek to reflect the new features of French diplomacy after its return to NATO: more involvement in regional flashpoints on the strength of NATO; handling of NATO-US relations through a race rather than confrontation; and addition of Africa to NATO's scope of activities to serve French national interests. While it may be predicted that NATO will become a key strategic underpinning of French efforts to maintain great-power status in the 21st century, it remains to be seen what impact this will have on the future of international affairs.