The Moral Hazard In The Fund Supervision Of Social Old-age Insurance And Its Control

The pension is an important component of the social security system, providing income or living arrangement for retirees. Pension is essentially a deferred payment; it has the features of undertaking regularly paid in advance, delaying payments and long-term savings. And from a development view, the market management narrowly mandate can not effectively disperse risks, the fund trustee is very difficult to guarantee pension funds'value increasing in the pressure of inflation risks. And an aging population and the rapid growth of pension expenditures are making pension fund investments to market inevitable. The moral hazard in the investment control of pension directly relate to the all participants pursuit their own economic interest, information asymmetry and inadequate systems. This article on the base of the domestic and foreign research about the moral hazard problem in the pension, combined with the latest theoretical research, analyzing the descriptions of the fund investment managers, trustees, principal or beneficiary and fund custodian in the old-age insurance. At last approaching the causes of the existence of moral hazard, and giving the measure to deal with it.As China's "three pillar" pension model gradually improve, the size of pensions expand, the pension will become a significant role in the capital market. But the existence of moral hazard of pension will lead to low efficiency of the pension fund's investment supervision. Now the insurance market is information asymmetry, short-sighted and irrational design of the system, and lacking an effective regulatory regime of pension fund investment. All these often result in the participant of the pension to pursue the subject to maximize their own interests; the social pooling of old-aged insurance is difficult to rise, trustee misappropriated, embezzled pension fund, the responsibility of fund investment manager is inequality, the low investment returns, and the fund custodian regulatory weakness are serious impacting on the maintenance and appreciation of pension funds.In order to prevent the moral hazard which in the investment supervision of pension fund, need to establish an open and transparent regulatory system and perfect information disclosure system, so that can lower the asymmetry of information among the main participant. Coordinated regional economy development can improve the level of pension, innovated the system of investment operation and strengthen the pension system of the incentive and restraint mechanisms. Reasonable defined the participant right and property rights of investment regulation of social old-aged insurance, and building a good legal environment of social morality. However the research in this area is still relatively limited; mostly recognize the moral hazard as a feature of the insurance Industry. Therefore to explore the internal mechanism of moral hazard of pension problems and evading mechanism, for guiding the investment supervision of pension and improve the efficiency of pension market is very important.