Insurance industry, whose wealthy development means great significance to a country's social stability and economic development, is one of the backbone industries of modern finance. Yet insurance fraud has been a hunting nightmare to insurance industry all along and has been the third disaster after the natural and accidental disasters. The basis underlying insurance fraud is asymmetric information between participates in the insurance market. In light of significant asymmetric information in insurance market, combining the research results of game of theory and asymmetric information, this thesis analyzes the fraud behavior of participates, including policyholders, insurers and agents, in insurance market.Insurance frauds are divided into two areas: reverse selection and moral risk. Combining the actual situation in insurance market, employing information discriminating model as the main method to control reverse selection and analyzing detailed, this thesis proves that there is only one separating equilibrium, which demonstrates that it is feasible to design information discriminating model to mark off different risk preference policyholders by different insurance contract. The writer finds the solution of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the game analysis of policyholders' moral risk. Additionally, by set up mathematical model, this thesis draws a conclusion that insurance companies should take fine... |