Research On Anti - Fraud System Construction Of Shanghai Social Endowment Insurance

Along with the complete coverage of social pension security system, sustained growth of social pension insurance fund scale, the pension insurance fraud showed an rapid increasing trends. All of this brought potential security problems. As a consequence, constraints and prevention of the pension insurance fraud is the key to ensure the normal operation of this system.Shanghai, as a megalopolis, is among the top in the nationwide of both insured number and fund size. After more than 20 years of reform, Shanghai social pension insurance has been mature, but the anti-fraud system establishment is still at the exploration stage. There is no systematized and refined standard in implementation, also with limited experience. In recent years, although the government issued Social Insurance Law and convict fraud to avoid this illegal act, Shanghai still has neither relevant implementation regulations nor normative rules, lacking workable model as well.I suppose, from information economics perspective, the reason of this kind of phenomenon, on the one hand is due to behavior subject characteristics of "economic man", on the other hand is the result of Asymmetric information due to the moral hazard. But the system construction can be based on the mechanism design theory of moral hazard circumvention. Thus, this thesis tries propose corresponding suggestions regarding the practical work of Shanghai social pension insurance anti-fraud from the perspective of the theory of Asymmetric information, through the social pension insurance fraud and behavior factors analysis, combined with the present situation and characteristics of Shanghai social insurance, analyze the occurrence of pension insurance fraud in essence, and through the analysis of information efficiency to explore the direction of Shanghai anti-fraud system, through Case Analysis Method, documentary study, data analysis, etc.