Study On Relationship Between Corporate Governance And Income Distribution Of State-owned Resource Enterprise

In state-owned resource enterprise to a modern enterprise transformation process, formed the modern enterprise system, with the characteristics of modern enterprises, such as separation of ownership and control, conflict between the owners and operators and so on. However, state-owned enterprise both profit objectives and public interests, compared with the general corporate governance issues more serious, state-owned shareholding is still relatively strong administrative color. As multi-agent system of state-owned property, the state-owned enterprises have "absence of owners" phenomenon, formation of inside control ultimately. Corporate managers may be through non-market-oriented approach to a large number of excess profits into insider gains. According to the dividend agency theory, payment of cash dividends can reduce the manager's disposable cash flow, to prevent self-serving behavior of managers. Relatively, rational insider also can choose to pay or less pay cash dividend and retained earnings in the enterprise internal. Therefore, this paper researches relationship between corporate governance and income distribution based on the governance structure of state-owned resource enterprises. Around this question, chapters of this paper are arranged as following:The first part is an introduction. This chapter mainly discusses the background of this research, and leads to the research question, and defines the main concept about this study, introduces thoughts and methods and content.The second part is the literature review. The mainline of review is corporate governance structure and income distribution theory, summarized the existing research related to incomplete contract theory and agency cost theory. Finally, based on review existing empirical research and summarizes the existing problems, laying the foundation for follow-up study.The third part is the status of state-owned resource enterprise. First, focus on analysis status of the resource state-controlled listed companies. Then, analysis revenue status, corporate governance status and income distribution situation of state-owned resource enterprises.The fourth part is the empirical study. This chapter selected sample data according to certain standards, to consider corporate governance and governance of environmental factors, the variables selected indicators. And establishment of multiple regression models, test what relationship between the corporate governance and income distribution by regression analysis.The fifth part is suggestion. Based on the main research conclusion, proposed some suggestions for the problems of governance structure and profit distribution existing in the state-owned resource enterprise.The sixth part is conclusion. This chapter summarizes the main points of the whole paper, points out the limitations and future research directions.Based on analysis the whole situation of resource-based industry found that the overall profitability of resource-based listed companies is higher than the second industry, showed strong profitability. In the process of transforming to a modern enterprise in a more standardized form of governance structure, board size is maintained at a reasonable level, the independent director system in line with the Commission, to establish a supervisory system. However, there are some problems: due to the dominance serious, there is no effective checks and balances in equity; management incentive mechanism is not perfect. In the dividend payment also show some of the randomness, changing the form of dividend is changeful, and dividend payment level is not stable.This paper selection of the period 2006-2009 the corporate governance and dividends data of state-owned resource enterprises as object of study, using multiple regression analysis on relationship between corporate governance and the level of dividend payments, analysis showed that: (1) Ownership structure of state-owned resource enterprises is closely related with the level of dividend payments. The proportion of the largest shareholder and cash dividend payment ratio was negatively correlated; non-tradable shares and cash dividend payment ratio was positively correlated. (2) Board size and proportion of independent directors not related to the level of cash dividends paid. (3) The number of supervisors and pay cash dividends was positively related. (4) Executive compensation and pay cash dividends was negatively correlated. (5) Managerial Ownership and the payment of cash dividends per share are not relevant.Based on the above empirical conclusion, this paper presents some suggestions: (1) Optimize the equity structure. In order to reduce the irrational behavior of listed companies should be formation of checks and balances between the shareholders by through appropriate distributed equity. And through personified of state-owned shareholders change the phenomenon that the absence of owners. (2) Strengthen the independence of the Board of Directors. Reduce government administrative functions of enterprises, standardize the representation of directors and independent directors of the procedures and qualifications, or critical to prevent major shareholders who control the board of directors, the ability to truly be independent and professional staff of a public company board. (3) Improve the supervision and management. A clear code of conduct by the board of supervisors and supervisors of the rights and responsibilities, and effectively strengthen the supervision of the board of supervisors of the various functions of the Board of Supervisors truly effective supervisory role to play. (4) Perfect management incentive and restraint mechanisms. Establish comprehensive incentive mechanism includes compensation and benefit, performance appraisal and equity incentives, and strengthen management constraints.Possible contributions of this paper are: (1) This paper analysis deeply income status, corporate governance and income distribution of state-owned resource-based enterprises, and provides a favorable reference comprehensive understanding of resource-based industries status. (2) According to the dividend agent theory, design indicator system in terms of the ownership structure, characteristics of governance and incentive of management three aspects, testing the governance structure on the influence of income distribution. (3)Empirical results confirm the agency theory in state-owned resource-based enterprises dividend distribution has strong explanatory, provide a useful perspective for formulate rational income distribution policy.In summing up previous studies, this paper to achieve some results, but there is still some limitations of the research process because the theoretical knowledge and time constraints. (1) This paper select the sample concentrated in the resource-based listed company, so results of data analysis may be affected by industry characteristics, which can't sufficient explain the universality relationship between corporate governance and income distribution of listed companies and lack of a more rigorous and comprehensive empirical evidence. (2) This paper mainly study governance structure on the influence of cash dividend payment, so excluding the company unallocated cash dividend in period 2006-2009, so unable to validate these enterprise distribution tendencies. (3) In this paper, mainly consider the internal corporate governance on the impact of cash dividends, fails to consider the external governance environment and regulatory policy variables such as forced dividends policy of CSRM, which may an important factor. The reason why the paper fails to consider these factors is that they not well quantified, which limited the results.