Screening Contract Application In Ecological Compensation To Reduce The Information Rent

Asymmetric information exists in socio-economic fields widely, the informationrental caused by asymmetric information problems seriously affect implementation ofthe performance in the economic system, socio-economic areas. To this end, themodels in the incomplete contracts of theory contract theory solve the many problemsof information rental, these models is to study the binding characteristics of incentive,to make full use of the results of game theory and methods, specific researchinformation in the agency relationship and incentive problems.This is the first concern of ecological compensation of the information asymmetry,use the proposed method of screening contracts based on principal-agent model. Asthe parties involved in ecological compensation is the relationship which iscompensation and to compensation ,the focus is how to reveal the true state of lowability agents, and encourage them participation in this program. so the method ofscreening contracts solve whose main interest was compensation for to tell the truth,the results need to be compensated the amount of compensation calculated byselecting the party really, in order to reduce information rent will be have the (L) lowopportunity cost types of farmers and (H) high opportunity cost type of farmers, wewill design two types of contracts: the seller of high-yield low-cost type of contract(L-type contract) , high-cost low-output type of contract (H-type contracts). L-typecontract is to reveal the types of farmers with low opportunity cost; H-type contract isto reveal the high opportunity cost of farm households, that is H-type farmers. Thesetwo types of contracts must have two features: to encourage farmers to activelyparticipate in and encourage farmers to tell the truth, that is, participation constraintsand incentive constraints. To encourage active participation of farmers, L and H-typecontract to provide compensation in the contract must be greater than the economicbenefits of the farmers original land; In order to restrict the farmers to tell the truth, wemust ensure that L-type farmers from receiving the contract to get the expected utilityis greater than receiving H-contract, H-type H-farmers from receiving the contractaccepted by the expected utility is greater than L-type contracts. Only by meeting these two features, L-type farmers will not be misrepresent, and H-typefarmers in order to obtain the appropriate compensation will choose to tell the truth,thus revealing the true type of rural households, reducing the information rent.In order to confirm the i screening contract method can reduce the rent contract, acase study of this paper proved that .the Calculation of Ganzhou compensation withscreening methods not only can reduce the information rent, but also revealedirrational that existing ecological compensation system.Through this paper, we have afew suggestions: first, the establishment of Forest Association, try to understand thefarmers involved in the project the true ecological compensation losses. Second,clearly defined the type of ecological compensation for different types of ecologicalcompensation to establish specific criteria to determine methods of ecologicalcompensation. Third, explore the specific impact of ecological compensation standardto determine the key factors. Fourth, arrange follow-up.Studing the method of screening contracts, we understand that: the informationrents by asymmetry information widespread in the society, economy and all areas, theinformation rent affected the fairness and the sustainability of trade .