| With the development of the national economy, the logistics industry in China's share of the national economy is growing. Third Party Logistics has been an important component of our country's logistics. Outsourcing is by some traditional members of the enterprise is responsible for the processing of non-core operations outside the transfer to the professional and efficient suppliers to take full advantage of the best outside of the professional resources to reduce costs, improve efficiency, increase the competitiveness of enterprises the ability of a management strategy. Although in the current business, there are considerable reservations about the business of the logistics business of their own, but most of them do not as a strategic business arrangement. More enterprises that are at the right time will be considered by an external contract services (third-party logistics services) for their provision of professional logistics services. Contract management is the process of third-party logistics outsourcing is also very important to the more cutting-edge issues. Compact inconsistencies between the goals, resulting in lower overall system performance. How to design and use of appropriate coordination mechanisms, so that the participating members of the action serve for the overall objectives of the system, thereby enhancing the overall performance of the supply chain, has attracted attention to the academic and business circles.However, third-party logistics service providers of the products provided by a non-physical services, has the following four characteristics: 1) the intangible nature; 2) can not Severability; 3) unable to reserve sexual; 4) heterogeneity (non-standard). Third-party Logistics Company is sold to customers of its logistics services, and service, with its characteristics, so the logistics were difficult to grasp the service, contrast, and physical products at the same time, customers bear the risk of feeling more, purchase decision-making it is very difficult to make. Although the assumption that buyers do not know a single third-party logistics service providers in what level of service in the end, but it can grasp the average level that the overall third-party logistics service providers can reach , so it is only willing to pay the average price for the purchase of logistics services, At this point, the service level higher than the price of the contract will not be traded, only can only provide less than the price of the contract logistics services can be traded. The purchase of logistics services in such cases to known conditions, the buyer will look forward to further lower the price to pay. This back and forth, and ultimately the market will only degenerate into the lowest quality level of contract logistics services can be traded, creating a problem of adverse selection.In this paper, the principal-agent theory, game theory and information economics theory, method to study the theoretical basis for logistics outsourcing, the use of signal transduction model to explain the third-party logistics providers through the purchase of logistics services to the transmission of signals to indicate their true level of service capacity, to be given to buyers of the high commission, but also to enable the purchase of real resources to achieve optimization, and find a separating equilibrium can be achieved signal. Followed by the screening model to signal the use of logistics services that can be purchased through the design of a set of rules of contract and an option to participate in bidding to identify the third-party logistics service providers the ability of the true level of service, given the right to pay the price to a reasonable and efficient allocation of resources measure. Screening of the signal to be met by the contract: (1) each type of third-party logistics service providers in the logistics services provided by the purchaser of an option contract to choose the one best suited to their contracts; (2) third-party logistics service providers can not be a profit negative; (3) there is no new contract can be made to choose the contract to provide third-party logistics service providers are strictly positive profits. Finally, include a fixed payment of a penalty factor of screening contracts, an analysis of the contract conditions should be met, as well as the principles of contract design.The demand side in the third-party logistics in supply and logistics contracts entered into after the demand for logistics companies can not be left as a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the entire process of logistics operation, it can not be observed in all third-party logistics provider behavior. In this way, third-party logistics providers may use information superiority, through the adoption of enterprise is not conducive to the logistics needs of some of the behaviors for their own benefit. Such as logistics service providers in order to reduce costs, resulting in the capacity of the existence of defects or reduction in the level of organization and management, it is possible that delayed delivery of goods, such as the phenomenon of defect. Moral hazard, not only undermines the reality of the logistics needs of the interests of enterprises, more demand-side deep logistics provider to the logistics of no confidence in the logistics industry development.Logistics Outsourcing buyers and sellers of contract design is an important means of coordination, for different contract to design suitable environment will greatly improve the level of collaboration both buyers and sellers. In this paper, the contract logistics business and among third-party logistics providers the incentive problem, not as a result of the efforts of the level of observation and third-party logistics service providers to increase the effort level can only be achieved through the incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the information symmetry and asymmetry of information under the conditions of linear contracts, and some interesting conclusions: 1) when the third-party logistics service provider risk-averse, they are unable to achieve the Pareto optimal level of contract logistics business needs Acting as pay; 2) contract logistics businesses to choose high-capacity third-party logistics service providers and options to improve the quality of a good market expectations of earnings; 3,)contract logistics businesses can write in the new contract-related variables, to increase revenue, reduce costs.Analysis of third-party logistics through the moral hazard of the guiding principles of governance should be to stimulate both the main and monitoring, a number of measures, such as choice of excellent third-party logistics enterprises entrusted the logistics business, a clear business enterprises for the needs of logistics outsourcing, For those with the enterprise's core business is closely linked to the business should be careful to choose outsourcing, can not be blind to the interests of business enterprises are also outsourced. Strengthen the supervision of third-party logistics enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms, given the different enterprises of different commissions, the design of effective incentives in order to effectively address the problem of moral hazard. |
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